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Editor’s Urban Development Journal: 
Greening The Ratings: Weed LEED & SEED  
 
Professor Will Macht, Editor 
 
Sustainable economic and environmental development ratings need 
revision on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. 
  ––––––––––– • ––––––––––– 
While it is gratifying that so many in the development community now seek to 
develop sustainably, far too few are reaching beyond the superficial indicia of 
green building. Too many simply seek an award of approval without 
understanding the limitations and contradictions inherent in the standards by 
which the awards are measured. The most dominant standards for measuring 
sustainability, the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
standards, promulgated by the U.S. Green Building Council, as well as the 
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Portland-based Green Building Initiative’s (GBI) Green Globes, are fraught with 
inconsistent goals and unbalanced priorities. 
 
There are several basic problems impeding a large-scale shift to sustainable 
development: 
1. The standards for measuring sustainability are often internally 
inconsistent. 
2. There is no correlation between point scores and economic costs and 
benefits. 
3. Different rating systems are largely incompatible. 
4. Sustainability is about long-term benefits, while developers’ timelines are 
short-term. 
5. Mixed-uses maximize sustainability, but single-use zoning is still 
predominant. 
 
1. The standards for measuring sustainability are often internally 
inconsistent. 
 
Review some contradictions within the LEED standards. 
Within a new LEED v 3.0, 110-point scale (formerly 69 
points), the Sustainable Sites SS Credit #2 now 
awards up to five points for development density and 
community connectivity (formerly it was a single 
point). Then it further restricts their value by 
requiring that the site be one that was previously 
developed, have more than 60,000 square feet per 
acre, or at least 10 units per acre, plus be within 
one-half mile of at least ten “Basic Services” defined 
to include such things as a grocery, pharmacy, bank, 
library, school, day care center, post office and a park. 
And at least eight of those services must already be in operation while the other 
two must be operational within one year. While highly desirable, these 
restrictions act as disincentives for suburban developers to attempt to develop 
mixed-use projects. 
 
But the mixed-use density objective is inconsistent with the open space one. 
The section on Sustainable Sites (SS Credit #5.2) provides a credit for 
maximizing open space. And it exacerbates that conflict with the density 
objective by requiring that as much as 50 percent of the site be in open space, 
or at least 25 percent more than the local zoning ordinance. The anomaly is 
that the requirements of the sustainable sites section actually discourage 
density and encourage sprawl, which by its very nature is not sustainable. It 
would likely be easier for a developer to get credit for a suburban site with 
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copious open space than for a dense urban project. Yet the suburban site 
would generate vastly more vehicle miles traveled (VMT) which certainly does 
more harm to the environment. 
 
Then the same sustainable sites section grants two points for parking capacity 
(SS Credit #4.4) and the easiest way to obtain that credit is for a developer to 
provide no new parking. Or a developer could provide parking for fewer than 
five percent of the full-time equivalent occupants of the building, and then also 
allocate at least five percent of that parking for carpools and vanpools.  
 
This parking provision conveys a 
misunderstanding of the relationship 
between parking and density. The 
way to increase density is not to limit 
the absolute number of parking 
spaces, but rather to maximize the 
size of development that a number of 
parking spaces can support. That is 
done through reducing the relative 
shared parking ratio between the 
number of parking spaces and the 
number of mixed-uses, square feet 
and units that the parking supports.  
 
Furthermore, to allocate any spaces for a specific class of users, as SS Credit 
4.4 does, removes them from a shared parking pool and increases their 
inefficiency, which is presumably precisely opposite of the intention of the 
LEED framers. Environmental planners too often do not recognize that greater 
density of parking leads to greater density of uses, provided uses are mixed and 
the spaces are not allocated. At $40,000 to $50,000 per space, no rational 
developer wants to build any more parking than is absolutely necessary. 
Developers make money selling units or office or retail space, not on selling 
parking. Therefore, planners and developers share an interest in making 
parking efficient, a fact many planners simply fail to recognize. 
 
2. There is no correlation between point scores and economic costs and 
benefits. 
 
To take the sustainable sites category again, a developer 
can earn one point by not developing in a flood plain, 
prime farmland, habitat of endangered species or other 
sensitive sites. [SS Credit #1]. That may have zero cost. 
But to earn points for density, [SS Credit #2] a developer 
might need to spend hundreds of thousands, or even 
millions, of dollars to buy a previously developed site and 
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to develop it with more than 60,000 square feet per acre. And to earn the one 
point Brownfield Site credit [SS Credit #3], a developer could spend millions of 
dollars remediating the brownfield. The LEED brownfield point is 0.9 percent of 
the total and Green Globes allocates only 2 percent, better but still minimal. A 
developer might ask why invest the extra dollars to earn the difficult point 
when one can invest little or nothing for the easy one? This disparity is 
counter-productive. 
 
Or again in the sustainable sites category, a developer could earn one point for 
the Heat Island Effect credit [SS Credit #7.2] by using a white roof, or lowering 
the foot-candle power of exterior lighting to earn the Light Pollution Reduction 
credit (SS Credit #8). These are marginal costs on a totally different scale of 
investment than the density or brownfield credits. 
 
Or compare the brownfield 
credit costs to earn one point 
with another standard in the 
sustainable sites category that 
credits one point for the 
provision of bicycle racks for 
five percent of a building’s 
occupants, with a shower in 
the building [SS Credit #4.2]. Green Globes awards three points for 
development in a commercial zone, where property will be significantly more 
costly, but also three points for development within a quarter mile from a 
bicycle path, where it will likely be far cheaper. To equate those provisions 
imbalances priorities between costs and benefits, not only in the strict 
economic sense, but also with respect to energy and environmental benefits. 
 
In the Water Efficiency category, a developer can earn two LEED points for 
installing drought-resistant plants that need no irrigation. [WE Credit #1.2] Or 
the developer could earn two LEED points by treating 50 percent of the sewage 
wastewater onsite to tertiary standards [WE Credit #2]. LEED loses credibility 
equating the point scores for these items. The former is very low cost and of 
marginal benefit. The latter is very high cost and renders substantial benefits. 
Where is the cost/benefit analysis to justify the priorities in these ratings? 
 
In the Energy category, a developer could increase energy cost savings by 12 
percent and earn a single credit [EA Credit #1]. Or one could hire an energy 
commissioning agent early in the design process and earn double, two points 
[EA Credit #3]. Or one could earn three points by installing an energy 
consumption metering device system for one year, [EA Credit #5], something 
one would have thought would be a pre-requisite for earning any credits. There 
appears to be no correlation between costs and benefits in this priority system. 
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One could earn two points by providing at least 35 percent of the building’s 
electricity from renewable sources for two years [EA Credit #6] or earn the 
same two points by installing onsite renewable energy solar panels that 
produce only three percent of the building’s energy. The wide disparity in 
renewable energy production and costs required to earn the same two points 
belies the internal consistency of the standards themselves with respect to 
costs and benefits.  
 
In the Materials & Resources category, a developer could 
maintain 55 percent of the walls, floors and roof of a 
building and earn only a single point. [MR Credit #1.1] Or 
the developer could take the easy route and also earn one 
point by simply reusing five percent of the materials. [MR 
Credit #3.1]. Or s/he could not preserve or reuse any 
structure or materials at all but simply earn one credit by 
buying any materials with 10 percent recycled content. 
[MR Credit #4.1]  
 
Just using concrete can earn one point, since it almost always is extracted or 
manufactured within 500 miles [805 km] of the site. [MR Credit #5.1] Or the 
developer could earn one point by using cotton insulation or wheat-board office 
partitions. [MR Credit #6]. Upon what basis can the USGBC conclude that each 
of these techniques is of equal value? 
 
In the environmental quality category, a developer could earn 
one point for installing carbon dioxide meters tied to the HVAC 
system, [EQ Credit #1] or by day-lighting 75 percent of the floor 
area, [EQ Credit #8.1], or for providing operable windows, [EQ 
Credit #6.2], or by buying task lighting. [EQ Credit #6.1] What is 
the basis upon which these items are determined to be of equal 
value, either environmentally or economically? 
 
LEED awards one point for hiring a LEED-accredited professional consultant 
[ID Credit #2] –– the same one point score earned for spending millions of 
dollars to remediate a brownfield. The lack of priorities in scoring points, the 
failure to incorporate cost/benefit analyses into its awards, and the neglect of 
economic values and benefits, undermines LEED’s seemingly widespread 
acceptance by the development community. 
 
3. Different rating systems are largely incompatible. 
 
Despite its prevalence in the United States, the LEED rating system 
promulgated by the U.S. Green Building Council, a Washington, D.C.-based 
non-profit corporation, is not the only rating system. The federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy have 
formulated the Energy Star rating system.  
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Unlike LEED, only 32 percent of which is devoted to energy conservation, 
Energy Star is 100 percent based on energy efficiency. Its ratings are awarded 
relative to energy consumption based on a database of peer buildings that are 
similar with respect to size, use, occupancy, hours of operation and location. 
To achieve an Energy Star rating, a building must reach a benchmark that 
makes it more efficient than 75 percent of its peers. So only the top quartile of 
buildings may display an Energy Star. Licensed engineers must certify the 
accuracy of the energy consumption information submitted. Energy Star 
focuses more on existing buildings, whereas LEED concentrates more on new 
buildings, and architects have more familiarity with LEED.  
 
Essentially the main compatibility between the LEED and Energy Star systems 
is that in the LEED ratings for existing buildings, named LEED-EB, a building 
must achieve an Energy Star rating of at least 69, meaning that it is more 
energy efficient than 69 percent of its peers. Otherwise, these rating systems 
are not compatible or competitive. 
 
The only directly competitive system, more or less, is the Green Globes system, 
based on a 1,000-point scale, versus the 110-point LEED-NC scale. The 
categories, while somewhat similar, are weighted differently.  
 
Credits LEED 
v 2.2 
LEED 
v 2.2 
LEED 
v 3.0-
2009 
LEED 
v 3.0-2009 
Green 
Globes 
Green 
Globes 
 Points Percentage Points Percentage Points Percentage 
       
Sustainable Sites 14 20% 26 24% 120 12% 
Water Efficiency 5 7% 10 9% 130 13% 
Energy & 
Atmosphere 
17 25% 35 32% 300 30% 
Materials & 
Resources 
13 19% 14 13% 145 14.5% 
Indoor 
Environment 
15 22% 15 14% 160 16% 
Innovation & 
Design 
5 7% 6 5% - - 
Regional 
Priorities 
0 0% 4 3% - - 
Project 
Management 
- - - - 100 10% 
Emissions - - - - 45 4.5% 
       
Totals 69 100% 110 100% 1,000 100% 
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The Green Building Initiative (GBI) that sponsors Green Globes had its genesis 
in Toronto in 1996 by the Canadian Standards Association. Now, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) has accredited the GBI as a standards 
developer. The ANSI process is consensus-based and involves a committee of 
users, producers, interested parties and non-governmental organizations. 
Green Globes is an online-based 
interactive system where point scores are 
known as the design proceeds, unlike 
LEED whose results are not known until 
the project is completed, commissioned 
and certified. Green Globes does require 
third-party verification. Because its 
categories, credits and points are different from LEED’s, making cost-effective 
comparisons and judgments is difficult. But it does not appear that 
cost/benefit analysis is endemic to standards setting of either ratings system. 
 
 
4. Sustainability is about long-term benefits while developers’ timelines 
are short-term. 
 
One of the major impediments to wide-scale adoption of green building has 
little to do with the rating systems but much more to do with the timelines of 
developers, which have become shorter and shorter due to the: 
• securitization of real estate markets,  
• rise of merchant developers,  
• conversion of private developers to traded real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), and 
• proliferation of hedge funds operating in the real estate sector. 
 
The Wall Street virus of its short-term attention span on quarterly earnings 
reports has spread to developers as well as to lenders, especially as secondary 
mortgage markets morphed into derivatives with mortgage pools, sliced and 
diced into more arcane tranches, leading to the implosion of those markets 
during the last year. 
 
There was a time when visionary developers thought in terms of quarter 
centuries, not three-month quarters. When John D. Rockefeller, Jr. built 
Rockefeller Center, it was to hold, not to be sold. The great real estate fortunes 
of John Jacob Astor, Henry Huntington and Henry Flagler, the Durst, 
Shorenstein and Ashforth families, and many others, were built on the premise 
of building for the long term. Such a family will be very concerned about 
building using solid materials and quality systems that have longer lives and 
lower operating expenses over extended periods.  
Macht •  Editor’s Urban Development Journal • Greening The Ratings: Weed LEED & SEED 
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •  Quarterly & Urban Development Journal • 4th Quarter 2009 •  Page 10 
But a merchant developer, who will flip a building upon completion, if not 
before, will not absorb short-term pain for long-term gain that would accrue to 
future owners. And as residential markets have been overtaken by condo-
miniums, where the developer, who enjoys none of the savings in energy 
operating expenses, but rather sells upon completion, will spend little time and 
money on building well unless there is a short-term premium upon sale. With a 
glut of condominiums on the market as a result the national binge on short-
term credit, that is very unlikely to happen anytime soon. 
 
Unfortunately, build and hold has been a strategy few developers have been 
either willing or able to follow. If the business of development is the creation of 
value, which it is, green building creates long-term values, especially as energy 
prices rise. And with those rising energy prices, buildings that are not green 
will become functionally obsolescent, analogous to the way that energy-
consumptive sports utility vehicles (SUVs) have witnessed values that have 
depreciated more quickly than in previous years. So the risks of not building 
green will rise. 
 
5. Mixed-uses maximize sustainability, but single-use zoning is still 
predominant.  
 
While some shortsighted private developers have been 
slow to adopt green building, public planners are often 
locked into outmoded land use planning models. The 
United States is still, for the most part, ossified in single-
use zoning –– the very antithesis of green building and 
vital mixed-use urbanity. While many planners decry cars 
and seek universal mass transit, and LEED planners 
award credits for projects without cars, the very single-
use zones in which the lion’s share of new buildings are 
constructed actually create demand for the very cars they 
abhor. Shared parking is impossible without mixed uses, 
yet in very few areas can a developer build a 
mixture of uses as of right. And when s/he can, 
different building codes apply separately to each 
use, thereby raising costs.  
 
In many ways, single-use zoning is a 20th Century 
solution leading to the sprawled land-use patterns 
that exacerbate climate change and segregate 
society by income, class, age, infirmity, and formerly by race. What is needed is 
a 21st Century solution based on universal mixed-use land use patterns. The 
provisions of single-use zoning are in turn aggravated by outmoded concepts of 
maximum lot coverage, minimum setback requirements, maximum floor area 
ratios and maximum heights that help to ensure sprawling land-use patterns. 
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To see that the LEED standards can reinforce those outmoded concepts, as 
outlined above, should give pause to every planner who seeks to advance green 
building specifically, and sustainable development more generally. 
 
To provide, as do LEED ratings, that a bicycle rack can earn equal credit to 
brownfield redevelopment, that dual-flush toilets are equally creditable as the 
reuse of an entire building, with all its embodied energy, is to alienate those 
whom the USGBC most wants to convince to adopt its standards.  
 
SEEDing Green Building 
 
One might consider some positive prescriptions for change to a newer set of 
standards based upon a model of cost/benefit analysis of both economic and 
environmental benefits. To encapsulate the cost/benefit concept, for purpose of 
discussion, one might call this system Sustainable Enviro-Economic Develop-
ment (SEED) ratings. Within each category, individual items would be ranked 
according to the impact each would have on energy consumption and 
environmental benefit relative to life-cycle cost. Those with the highest 
cost/benefit ratios would be given the most points.  
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Rather than be complacent with LEED, or Green Globes, one can suggest that 
if the ratings were adjusted to become balanced by cost/benefit analyses, like 
the SEED ratings proposed, vastly more developers would buy into the ratings 
system and save enormous amounts of energy, while they satisfy pent-up 
demand for green buildings, which can lead to premiums for green building 
sales, occupancy and rent. 
 
Moreover, developers and building owners who do not build green will likely see 
their buildings experience functional obsolescence and declining values. To 
achieve more universal adoption of its rating system, the U.S. Green Building 
Council, and GBI’s Green Globes, should weed and overhaul its LEED and 
Green Globes ratings and truly plant a SEED for widespread green building. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully yours, 
William P. Macht 
Professor Will Macht 
Editor, Center for Real Estate Quarterly 
Associate Director, Center for Real Estate 
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Deleveraging Commercial Real Estate:  
Equity Investment Market Dynamics  
  
Mike R. Kingsella, Associate, KPMG LLP 
Christopher Longinetti, Senior Vice President, ScanlanKemperBard Companies 
 
 
 
Tom Wolfe’s 1998 novel, A Man in Full, portrays the fictional fall from grace of a formerly 
acclaimed real estate developer, Charlie Croker.  In one of its more famous chapters, Croker is 
summoned to a breakfast meeting that quickly turns into an unpleasant grilling at the hands 
of his lender.  The scene evokes the often-uncomfortable images that surround the archetypical 
commercial real estate loan workout, but more importantly it demonstrates the strong 
dynamics of the two-party relationship of lender and borrower.  During the real estate crash of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, borrowers and their lenders often had similar uncomfortable 
interactions.  But these interactions frequently led to a productive working out of problematic 
investments, resetting expectations of both the equity investors and the debt lenders. In 
conjunction with the policies of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)1, these workouts were a 
critical component to the resolution of the troubled assets of institutions not subject to 
insolvency in a market characterized by massive overbuilding and a major national recession.   
 
The nature and source of commercial real estate debt and equity capital changed through the 
course of the current cycle.  Today, the relationship between borrower and lender has been 
diluted by a myriad of participants in any given real estate investment – including Commercial 
                                                
1 The Resolution Trust Corporation was the U.S. Government-owned asset management company charged 
with liquidating assets of savings and loan institutions declared insolvent by the Federal Office of Thrift 
Supervision. 
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) bondholders, large loan syndication participants, junior 
and mezzanine lenders, preferred equity and institutional equity investors and entrepreneurial 
investment sponsors. This dilution seemingly has led to an environment where no single 
participant can take the first step towards truly resolving troubled real estate investments.  
 
Indeed, the commercial real estate investment industry finds itself in one of the worst down-
market cycles in decades.  Instead of suffering from oversupply issues that were characteristic 
of the real estate crash of the early 1990s, today’s commercial real estate market is reeling from 
an unprecedented and dramatic tightening in global capital flows and a sudden and 
substantial slackening in tenant demand across all real estate asset classes.  In this article we 
explore current economic trends that are driving deterioration in commercial property markets, 
analyze trends in the global capital markets relative to commercial real estate investment and 
discuss practical strategies that are being employed by market participants in order to 
maximize commercial real estate value in the context of the deleveraging economy. 
 
Current Market Trends 
 
Many real estate market participants have commented that the current real estate downturn is 
the worst we have seen in decades, including the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s.  
Transaction activity has dropped to minimal levels. Indeed, from 2007 to 2009, the number of 
commercial real estate transactions fell 92%, representing a drop in dollar volume from $421 
billion in 2007 to $17 billion in year-to-date 2009. 
 
 
Source: Real Capital Analytics Inc. 
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With the institutional equity investment market reeling from significant losses, redemption 
issues and the denominator effect,2 transaction activity throughout the commercial real estate 
sector has ground to a halt.  As a consequence of the decline in transaction activity, owners 
have few data points to reference when valuing a portfolio, and lenders have few data points to 
guide them in ascertaining exposure risk.  The commercial real estate sector as a whole is hard 
pressed to identify appropriate risk-weighted returns on capital, fair market capitalization rates 
and, as a result, to determine the appropriate valuation of real estate assets.     
 
What spurred the dramatic decline in transaction activity in the first place?  Commercial real 
estate investment performance began this decade on a strong note.  Despite economic hiccups 
related to the dot-com bust and 2001 national recession, commercial real estate continued to 
deliver strong returns on investment.  Additionally, the growth of the Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) market, standardization of financial reporting and the globalization of the financial 
markets led to a continued and long-term influx of capital into real estate as an asset class.   
 
The globalization of the financial markets and a long-term low interest rate environment led to 
an exponential increase in the issuance of CMBS.  Volumes soared, reaching a peak issuance 
of $230 billion in 2007.  At the same time, institutional investors, ranging from life insurance 
companies to pension fund advisors, increased their overall allocations to commercial real 
estate.  Real estate, as an asset class, transformed from an alternative or tactical asset class to 
 
  
Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert 
                                                
2 Commercial real estate sales required by asset value declines in institutional investor asset pools’ target-
restricted real estate asset allocations. 
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a crucial, strategic component of a diversified investment portfolio.3  As a result, from 2001 to 
2005, annual net investment in U.S. commercial real estate assets increased by 251 percent. 
 
By 2005, increased pressure from the bond-buying community to purchase CMBS led major 
investment banks to increase the size and frequency of their loan securitizations.  This increase 
could only be accommodated by lax underwriting standards, higher leverage and, ultimately, 
less attention to detail.  First mortgages were often written up to 90 percent of value at 
historically low interest rates — sometimes interest-only and almost always on a nonrecourse 
basis.  Increasingly, CMBS lenders began underwriting future, unrealized income to capture 
additional loan volume, exposing CMBS investors to the potential of greater default risk if 
market fundamentals were ever to slip. 
 
But the spark that triggered the commercial real estate liquidity crisis ultimately came in the 
form of delinquencies and defaults observed in the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(RMBS) market.  Bond buyers began to analyze more closely the risks inherent in the 
aggressive loans in the underlying CMBS bond pools.  After evaluating the underwriting of 
these loans, bond buyers lost confidence that CMBS were risk- rated and priced appropriately.  
As a result, bond buyers devalued these securities as an investment class, driving CMBS yields 
to astronomical levels, subsequently leading to rapid inflation of the cost of capital for 
borrowers.  This paralyzed the CMBS market and CMBS issuers were left laden with 
commercial real estate debt that was immediately mispriced and with no discernable market 
buyers.  Unable to sell this mountain of debt intended for the securitization market, CMBS 
originators became unintended balance sheet lenders.  With no source of new liquidity and no 
practical means to liquidate their current holdings, these lenders have virtually remained out 
of the permanent lending market since the credit crunch began in early 2007. 
 
While easy access to credit was a major factor in rising values and today’s current lack of debt 
capital, conversely, it is a major contributor to the current cycle of falling asset values.  In fact, 
according to a recent RREEF research report, during this decade market participants became 
increasingly reliant upon the availability of inexpensive debt capital in order to meet ever-
increasing return thresholds demanded by the global investment community.  By the end of 
2008, the global commercial real estate debt market accounted for about 58 percent of the $12 
trillion real estate investable universe.4     
 
After the collapse of the CMBS lending market, commercial real estate investors could no 
longer achieve their yield requirements at market pricing.  In fact, yield requirements have 
widened, driving up capitalization rates and driving down values. 
 
                                                
3 David J. Blum and Scott Urdang, “Repricing Risk in the U.S. Commercial Real Estate Market,” PREA 
Quarterly Winter 2008: 32-35. 
4 Global Commercial Real Estate Debt: Deleveraging Into Distress (RREEF Research, June 2009). 
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Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
 
Today, observable commercial real estate pricing is dropping quickly and steeply.  Prices have 
already come down 40 percent from their peak in October 2007, according to the 
Moodys/REAL Commercial Property Price Index, based on repeat sales, from Real Capital 
Analytics.  Equity investors, and in many cases lenders, who entered the market from 2005 to 
2007, now find that their initial capital investment is significantly in excess of current market 
value.  For equity investors, this precipitous drop in market pricing has effectively wiped out 
any prospect of a return on their original investments.  For lenders, the current environment 
means facing the very real prospects of a loss of loan principal.    
 
What is especially troubling is that the commercial real estate market may not yet have hit 
bottom.  In addition to marked value declines driven by the repricing of risk, the fundamental 
drivers of commercial real estate value are also deteriorating.  A sizeable reduction in the 
national workforce has reduced consumer spending, decreased the demand for retail, office 
and industrial space, and has led to a decline, and potentially negative growth, in household 
formation, a driver of housing demand.  On October 20, 2009, the Wall Street Journal argued 
that “the U.S. has shed 7.2 million jobs since the recession began in December 2007, the 
deepest contraction since the Great Depression. Even if the job market started spitting out jobs 
as fast as it did during the 1990s boom, adding 2.15 million private-sector jobs a year, the U.S. 
wouldn't get back to a 5% unemployment rate until late 2017.”   
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. 
 
In the long run, it may be owners of commercial real estate who suffer most.  Today, owners 
are facing a market environment where rents are declining, vacancies and concessions are 
increasing, and operating expenses such as property tax and utilities continue to rise.  The 
extended duration nature of commercial leases suggests that these reductions in revenue will 
continue to drag down values over the long term and implies further negative consequences for 
investors who acquired commercial real estate assets during the peak period and relied on 
lease-up and rent growth for their exits. 
 
Equity Market Implications 
 
It appears that the equity markets have been much quicker to recognize and address their 
losses in commercial real estate assets than the debt markets.  This can be attributed to the 
ubiquitous structure of the closed-end equity investment funds as a finite pool of capital 
directed towards certain investment classes or strategies.  The fund losses are still distressing 
and in some cases total, but due to the nature of these investment vehicles, losses can be 
compartmentalized to a specific fund with broad brush blame attributed to the investment 
vintage, rather than to fund management itself.   
 
The National Council of Real Estate Fiduciaries (NCREIF), a non-partisan institutional real 
estate investment industry organization, has published the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) on a 
quarterly basis since 1978.  The NPI reflects the composite total rate-of-return measure of 
investment performance for a very large pool of individual commercial real estate properties 
acquired in the private market for investment purposes only.  All properties in the NPI have 
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been acquired, at least in part, on behalf of tax-exempt institutional investors – the great 
majority being pension funds.   
 
The NPI quarter-to-quarter return, which is plotted below, represents an estimate of the 
quarterly Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as if a property was purchased at the beginning of the 
quarter and sold at the end of the quarter with the investor receiving all net cash flow (net 
operating income minus capital expenditures) during the quarter.  The index illustrates the 
depth of losses that institutional investors have realized during the current cycle. 
 
 
 
For many investors, this poor investment performance has translated into the total loss of 
investment equity in certain property holdings.  The proliferation of non-recourse debt, which 
financed most of the deals of this vintage, provides little incentive to continue to dedicate 
resources to these assets, once investors have abandoned any hope of equity recovery. As a 
result, experienced fund managers have been able to triage the worst investments through an 
orderly forfeiture of properties in a series of high profile, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure 
arrangements with their lenders.  Therefore, the larger established owners of commercial real 
estate, while dramatically impacted by the market downtown, may not find these losses to be 
fatal.  Hines, Maguire, and California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) have all 
handed property back to their lenders.  In August 2009, the Wall Street Journal highlighted a 
local example, when the joint venture partnership capitalized by the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System walked away from its ownership position in Portland, Oregon’s 
KOIN Tower, relinquishing control of the property to its lender, New York Life Insurance Co.   
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With KOIN Tower, CalPERS stepped away from $39 million of pension fund equity it had 
invested as recently as 2007.  When faced with the need to commit additional capital to carry 
the deal through the current recession, CalPERS, acting as fiduciary to its pension policy 
holders, determined that it had simply overpaid for the property to the extent that the recovery 
of any of its investment equity was highly unlikely.  CalPERS facilitated an orderly return of the 
property to its lender determining it would not be prudent to throw good money after what it 
perceived to be bad and writing its equity investment down to nothing. 
 
Fund managers have realized tremendous losses in commercial real estate investments.  These 
losses typically stop at the fund level and do not necessarily represent systemic risk to the fund 
manager, particularly given the non-recourse nature of the debt provided at original 
acquisition.  In fact, sophisticated commercial real estate equity fund managers have been able 
to maintain investor confidence by directing blame for problem investments on market issues 
rather than operational issues.  The larger fund managers have generally been able to develop 
a compelling investment premise and raise additional capital with which to reenter the market 
with new strategies to capitalize on opportunities available in the current market.   
 
With so many deals gone bad, distressed opportunities are now appealing to investors as many 
are lured by what is viewed as a historic buying opportunity.  Meanwhile, equity investment 
managers are raising new capital, or repurposing existing funds to make such new 
investments.  Real Estate Alert’s annual review of high-yield real estate funds5 identified a 
growing number of distressed property and high-yield debt funds.  The review surveys closed-
end real estate funds of at least $50 million of equity, targeting a return greater than 10%.   
The increasing supply of distressed opportunities, and a credit constrained investment 
environment, has led to a change in the reported investment strategies of a larger portion of 
these funds. Increasingly, funds that categorized themselves as either opportunity or value-
added funds, representing almost 75% of investment equity by allocation, report targeting 
distressed properties and underperforming or defaulted loans.  In addition, during a period of 
time when more than 50 planned funds were either withdrawn from the market or ceased fund 
raising activities altogether, high-yield debt funds have increased from 54 such reported funds 
in 2008 to 73 funds in 2009 and are expected to account for 16 percent of the total equity 
being raised in the marketplace.   Real estate is a leveraged asset class, and until such time as 
traditional real estate lenders return to extending credit to refinance maturing loans or to buy 
transitional properties, the market clearly anticipates that this void will be partially addressed 
in the equity markets.    
 
The Real Estate Alert survey also provides insight into investor expectations.  Many 
institutional investors are not sanguine on the prospect of complete return of their capital for 
investments made in 2006 and 2007.   It is estimated that over $106 billion worth of properties 
may be categorized as distressed or potentially troubled with the most significant volume of 
distressed asset sales expected to be greatest in 2011.6    
 
Investors are aware that large fortunes have been made in the worst of economic times, and are 
preparing to take advantage of distress.  These same investors are not necessarily condemning 
their fund managers, as long they are demonstrating an aptitude for capable asset 
management of their troubled holdings.   
 
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 it directly held real estate 
loans and assets estimated at $43 billion.  On May 2, 2009 the front page of the New York 
                                                
5 Real Estate Alert, March 18, 2009. 
6 Ron Zuzack, Chief Operating Officer, Real Estate Equity, BlackRock, “Institutional View of the Real 
Estate Market”, May 27, 2009.  (Presentation). 
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Times business section profiled Mark Walsh, the former head of Lehman Brother’s global real 
estate group who was largely credited (or blamed) with Lehman’s aggressive foray into real 
estate investment and lending.  The article portrayed Mr. Walsh as a once admired financier 
who recklessly burdened Lehman with increasingly risky real estate deals, culminating with 
the $22 billion purchase in May 2007 of the Archstone-Smith Trust, a publicly traded company 
that held approximately 360 upscale apartment buildings across the country.   
 
In June 2009, Mr. Walsh and a group of former Lehman employees were back at work at 
Lehman Brothers managing the private-equity portfolio.7   Like Mr. Walsh, numerous fund 
managers throughout the industry are gearing up to take advantage of this pending distress, 
and in some instances, looking to profit among the ashes of their own ruins.   
 
Debt Market Implications 
 
In order to understand the current real estate debt market environment, we must appreciate 
the current position of financial institutions.  The willingness of debt investors to lend depends 
upon their own liquidity and the nature of their businesses.  The majority of life insurance 
company real estate loans were issued at ten-year terms, providing for amortization.  Maturing 
debts for these institutions have greater debt-service-coverage ratios and loan-to-value ratios, 
mitigating refinancing risk.   
 
Depository banks traditionally have lent for three- to five-year terms.  As a result, many of the 
real estate loans coming due in the next two years will be of recent vintage with difficult 
declining valuation issues. Market pricing declines of 40 percent means that the subordinated 
investment equity has been eliminated and lenders are experiencing the prospect of principal 
losses on any asset originated at over 60% loan-to-value.  Over the last several years, banks 
more commonly underwrote loans at 80% - 90% of value, meaning that today’s values have 
migrated well through the investment equity and into the lender’s position.  Banks are forced 
to go it alone.   
 
 
Note: The matrix above illustrates debt shortfall of an assumed initial loan based on $100 property value, 75% LTV. 
Source: Prudential Real Estate Investors 
                                                
7 Peter Lattman and Anton Troianovski, “Lehman Property Boss Returns,” Wall Street Journal June 17, 
2009. 
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The table presented on the prior page, adapted from a Prudential Real Estate Investors equity 
research report8, presents the potential maturity default risk to real estate owners, and their 
lenders, as a result of a combination of declines in underlying property values and the new 
underwriting standards. 
 
It must be remembered that banks, unlike equity investment funds, are not single-purpose 
entities formed to direct debt capital into specific real estate investments.  Depository banks 
have a fiduciary responsibility to their depositors, and must at all times maintain sufficient 
capital reserves to account for credit risk related to assets (such as loans) and other off-balance 
sheet exposures.  When a banking institution cannot maintain sufficient capital relative to 
loan-loss exposure, it is deemed inadequately capitalized and is shut and sold by its regulator.   
 
When a bank writes down the principal value of a debt investment, it must raise capital 
reserves to offset the write-off.  Given the substantial amount of exposure to continued losses 
related to commercial real estate debt investments, banks are finding it difficult to attract 
private capital, particularly when banks are competing with new equity opportunities targeting 
higher yielding opportunities devoid of the drag and uncertainty of underperforming or non-
performing legacy assets.   
 
As a result, banks are accessing capital infusions almost exclusively through the government’s 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and, if at all possible, very expensive equity issues under 
unfavorable terms.  GMAC is reportedly seeking a third round of federal assistance and 
demonstrates the difficulty lending institutions are having attracting private capital.  After the 
government published its banking stress tests in May, Bank of America and Wells Fargo 
succeeded in raising tens of billions of dollars from private sources. However, they do not 
represent the majority of banks that have been unable to raise any capital.9   
 
Raising capital as a bank with a deteriorating loan portfolio is an impossibility.  As of October 
24, 2009, regulators have shut 106 banks this year, the largest number since the savings and 
loan crisis. Those banks that can raise capital find it extremely costly.  Last month, West Coast 
Bancorp in Lake Oswego was able to raise $155 million from investors.  In order to do so, the 
bank significantly diluted current investors selling new investors stock representing an 83 
percent ownership interest at a price less than 20 percent of the bank’s September 30 book 
value.10    Deals such as these illustrate the need for liquidity by smaller banking institutions 
to stave off uncertainties surrounding the economy and the performance of their loan 
portfolios.    
 
Despite access to TARP funds, which are meant to offset additional loan loss reserves, it is 
widely believed that lenders are not writing down their commercial real estate debt investments 
to today’s market levels.  Many lenders are “pretending and extending”, in the parlance of 
market participants, executing loan extensions and renegotiating with their borrowers, in 
exchange for partial pay-downs and marginal increases to their interest rates.  Lenders hope to 
be able to weather the current market long enough to recover the full debt investment value by 
the extended maturity date. In the interim, the loan can be booked to the balance sheet as a 
performing loan garnering the preferential reserve treatment warranted such assets.  
 
                                                
8 Life After Debt: Coming to Grips with the Funding Gap (Prudential Real Estate Investors, September 
2009). 
9 Colin Barr, “GMAC grabs for another lifeline,” Fortune Magazine October 28, 2009. 
10 Jeff Manning, “New investors take most of Oregon’s West Coast Bancorp,” The Oregonian October 29, 
2009. 
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The implication of these practices is that banking capital for new lending will be tied up for the 
foreseeable future, at best, until the banks’ investments are repaid.  At worst, these 
institutions are temporarily forestalling failure.  Similar to what happened to Japan in the 
1990s, deals may be perpetually extended by lenders as equity investors focus on capital 
preservation in lieu of capital investment.  Transactions, new construction and development 
outside of the public sector could slow to a crawl and the commercial real estate industry 
overall could continue to experience tremendous downsizing. 
 
The valuation declines to date, coupled with significant impairment in commercial real estate 
investment asset performance, have led to substantial increases in defaults and non-accrual 
rates on depository banks’ loan portfolios.  As the chart below illustrates, commercial mortgage 
loan delinquency rates have risen sharply (2.10 percent to 4.70 percent) from the third quarter 
of 2008 to third quarter 2009. 
 
 
Source: Foresight Analytics LLC 
 
Current Strategies 
 
The similarity of the current credit crisis, compared to the last banking crisis, remains in that 
carelessness in lending practices resulted in massive balances of commercial real estate debt 
that cannot be repaid.  However, the nature of workouts has changed.  The recourse nature of 
the loans during the S&L crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly played a factor, in 
that recourse provided for a certain alignment of interests between borrowers and their lenders.  
Lenders were willing to work with borrowers given that they deemed recourse provisions would 
provide an additional measure of credit support. In turn, borrowers were adequately 
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incentivized to work for the lender’s principal recovery. However, at that time, banking 
essentially remained a two party system of lenders and borrowers.  Today, there are typically 
numerous tranches of debt holders, each with its own distinct agenda.  It is this change in that 
fundamental structure which, by far, has had the largest impact on workout strategies.   
 
In fact, it was the proliferation of CMBS debt issuances that irrevocably changed this dynamic.  
Today’s commercial real estate debt structures are easily comprised of multiple securitized 
layers of credits. The combination of these tranched and securitized structures, subordinate 
debt holders, mezzanine lenders, and preferred equity participants means more passive players 
who cannot as easily be brought to cooperate like banks and borrowers in a recourse, two 
party system. As described by one real estate professional, “there are more chairs in the 
conference rooms and less alignment of interests.”  The organizational issues within bank 
groups can be harder to resolve, and upon which to reach consensus, than even the 
substantive real estate matters.  
 
All of this has been exacerbated by the complete and rapid meltdown of value that led to most 
of these lenders being overwhelmed, from the standpoint of management capacity, as they were 
never staffed to handle an active asset management role.  Given that the structure of the 
commercial real estate capital markets’ environment has dramatically been transformed from 
the two-party system of the 1990s, and that banks are ill-equipped from a management 
standpoint to deal with the immeasurable wave of troubled deals that we face in today’s 
market, the flexibility to structure creative solutions, such as direct debt-for-equity swaps, 
simply does not exist. 
 
Still, some market participants have found that certain strategies exist to deal with the current 
market crisis.  The appropriate strategy to implement generally depends upon whether the 
subject asset is a performing cash flowing asset or if it is a non-cash flowing project still under 
development, or in a state of transition. 
 
In an effort to stave off maturity defaults, lenders have been receptive to working with 
borrowers who own properties with in-place cash flow, in an effort to give the borrowers more 
time to create additional value at the property level, or for the hope of a broader market 
recovery.  Ultimately, if cash flow is apparent and sustainable, banks are much more apt to 
extend loans, renegotiate interest rates to manageable levels, or otherwise redirect cash flow for 
the benefit of the property.  Sam Zell noted in a recent interview that today “we have a scenario 
of pretend and extend.  If an owner has no equity, just an option – a hope certificate – why 
would he sell unless he was under complete distress?  He’ll extend as long as he can keep 
paying the debt service and the lender will leave him in place.”11  
 
We also note that balance sheet lenders are able to be much more flexible than lenders who 
securitized and sold their loans. However, even special servicers who manage loans within 
commercial mortgage-backed securities pools have some degree of flexibility.  A commercial 
real estate owner we spoke with described a recent restructuring of a CMBS financing, where 
its lender eliminated certain lender-required impounds (maximizing cash flow available to cover 
future debt service), and reduced the interest rate in exchange for an interest accrual account 
and the investment of borrower held cash reserves. 
 
In general, most lenders, balance sheet and securitized alike, are generally reticent to extend 
for a period of greater than a 24-month extension on the primary term.  However, extensions 
subject to an asset performance test are also commonly reported elements of successful 
                                                
11 Zoe Hughes, “To Zell and back,” Private Equity Real Estate November 2009. 
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restructure transactions.  Even within the rigid structure of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities lending, there is room for flexibility.   
 
For non-cash flowing properties, such as development projects still under construction or 
partially completed asset repositions, lenders face a significant challenge.  In many cases, these 
loans have recently, or are about to, run out of money in their respective debt service reserves.  
In many of these variable rate financings, lenders funded considerable carrying costs, including 
reserves to fund future capital expenditures and debt service expenses, with the expectation 
that by the maturity of these financings, asset values would far exceed the outstanding loan 
principal balances.   
 
Unfortunately, for many of these transactions those debt service reserves have evaporated, 
asset values have not increased (and in many cases have decreased) and the lender is left with 
significant problems.  The most extreme example was Corus Bank, which extended loans 
primarily to condominium and speculative office and retail developers.  Corus Bank, which 
held $8 billion in assets, $6.6 billion in deposits, and 70 branches as of August 2009, was 
determined to be undercapitalized relative to its portfolio of deteriorating construction and 
commercial real estate loans.  The bank was seized by its regulators on September 11, 2009.12  
 
In these situations, lenders have to make a decision either to take back the property or commit 
additional capital to see the project through to completion.  In a two-party system, lenders had 
the ability to be flexible and restructure the debt in order to enable the borrower to achieve 
project completion, in some cases even subordinating their debt to the developers to encourage 
additional equity contributions.  In today’s market, lenders have limited flexibility as they must 
align their work outs with the interests not only of the borrower but also of various other debt 
holders, both senior and subordinate.  Still, there have been several recent situations whereby 
subordinate debt holders have agreed to acknowledge that their position has been wiped out 
and approve more creative workouts led by senior debt holders in exchange for a hope note, or 
the promise of an equity-like return on their subordinate unpaid balance, in the event that the 
workout leads to a positive return on investment at the deal level. 
 
Clearly, in certain cases lenders and borrowers are able to reach consensus on a workout plan 
that enables the borrower to complete his or her business plan.  However, this is much more 
difficult in the multi-party system prevalent in today’s market, with each lender in the capital 
stack vying to maximize its recapture of invested capital.  The resolution of property issues 
often falls secondary to the difficulties inherent in the debt structure.  
 
As we face the most significant real estate crash since the early 1990s, and one broader in 
scope, it is instructive to look back at lessons from the past to gain insight into recovery.  
However, there has been a fundamental shift in the structure of the global financial system 
generally, and specifically commercial real estate capital markets during this past decade.  
These changes have rendered many of the tools utilized during the last real estate implosion 
almost useless, and have necessitated that we conceive new strategies to emerge from the 
uncharted waters of the current crisis. 
 
This article represents the views of the authors only, and does not necessarily represent the views 
or professional advice of ScanlanKemperBard Companies or KPMG LLP. 
                                                
12 Nick Timiraos and Jessica Holzer, “Corus Bank Is the Latest to Be Seized by Regulators,” Wall Street 
Journal September 12, 2009. 
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Salem Multifamily Report 
 
Jamie Martinson, Senior Advisor, Sperry Van Ness Commercial Advisors [Multifamily] 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last 12 months, the Willamette Valley (WV) has quickly joined the rest of the nation in 
the grip of the economic recession. My annual forecast in February highlighted that 2009 was 
likely to be a back to basics year. I said then that landlords must stay ahead of market 
conditions as the recession continues and especially keep a close eye on proposed state and 
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local government job cuts during the current legislative session. The unemployment rate then 
was 9 percent but rose to 11.2 percent by August 2009. I noted earlier that the unemployment 
rate threatened continued low vacancy in the market and suggested that sales would occur as 
investors realized the underlying strength of the Willamette Valley market. Since that time, the 
Willamette multifamily market has seen a steep decline in occupancy rates and transaction 
volume and the reemergence of rent concessions as the national recession has deepened. The 
current operating conditions, coupled with the tightening of the credit market, have brought 
the multifamily investment market to a near standstill. 
 
Transactions 
 
The year-to-date numbers for the WV multifamily sales market are in line with national trends. 
According to Real Capital Analytics (REAL), nationally, multifamily investment-sales volume of 
properties >$5 million declined 79 percent over the first half of 2009 as compared to the prior 
year. In the WV, multifamily investment sales volume of properties >5 units declined 72 
percent during the same period as sales of only 275 units for $14,109,000 were closed. This is 
the lowest transaction volume since the first two quarters of 2005 yielded closings on 301 units 
for $14,258,000. 
 
The 12-month trailing sales volume for the WV fell to $45,312,900, off from $103,304,300 one 
year ago (Figure 1). The number of transactions dropped from 36 to 20, and units sold 
decreased from 1,640 to 734 in the same time period. As sales volume has decreased, listing 
volume has picked up due in large part to properties sitting with little activity or interest.  
 
Currently in the WV, LoopNet, RMLS, and the Willamette Valley MLS have 109 >5 unit 
multifamily properties listed for sale. Of those 109 multifamily projects on the market, only 17 
are listed with capitalization rates greater than 7.0, and several of those have cap rates based 
on proforma financials. Year to date, Oregon has only seen three transactions with properties 
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greater than 100 units in size. Two of those traded at a reported 7.6 cap rate: Pacific Crest in 
Tigard and McKenzie Meadow in Springfield. It is likely that one year ago these projects would 
have traded in the 6.25-6.75 percent cap rate range.   
 
 
Due in part to the disparity between asking CAP rate and selling CAP rate, the number of 
properties on the market and the average length of time a property is on the market is 
increasing. This increase in supply has had some impact on the price paid per unit, although 
with so few transactions in the WV it is difficult to compare sales today with past activity. 
According to REAL, properties pur-
chased between 2005 and 2008 
have suffered price drops of more 
than 20 percent, with multifamily 
properties purchased at the mar-
ket’s peak in 3Q 2007 dropping 32.2 
percent peak to trough. The 12-
month trailing price paid in the WV 
for seasoned units peaked in 3Q 
2008 at $59,991; that average price 
paid fell to $42,434 in 2Q 2009. For 
new units, the price peaked with the 
national market in 3Q 2007 at 
$81,106, fell sharply to $63,832 in 
2Q 2008, and has since recovered to 
$72,672.  
 
Notable WV sales in 2Q 2009 include: Hollywood Park 
Apartments in Salem, 52 units built in 1979, at 
$42,308/unit; Typres Gardens in Newberg, 20 units 
built in 1973 at $42,500/unit and at a 7.6 percent cap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vacancy/Concessions 
 
In her most recent Apartment Survey, Shirley Layne, an appraiser at Powell Valuation Inc, 
states that Salem/Keizer “vacancy has more than doubled from 2.95 percent to 6.17 percent 
since the fall 2008 survey, and concessions or inducements to occupy are being offered at 
almost every apartment complex.” Concessions have reentered the market with one-month free 
rent fairly standard on a 12-month lease in addition to move-in fee waivers. The waiver of 
move-in fees may also be in response to Oregon SB 771-B as landlords prepare for new limits 
on allowable fees which will begin January 1, 2010. 
 
The outlook for a reduction of vacancy rates is not optimistic as long as unemployment rates 
remain high, especially for those workers under 29 years of age. Nationally, 78 percent of 
households under age 25, and 63 percent of households under age 29 are renters. According to 
Dr. Sam Chandin, President and Chief Economist Real Estate Econometrics,  
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“Among the current challenges for multifamily investors and operators, the absence of new jobs 
for recent graduates and other young people has resulted in a sharper increase in the 
unemployment rate for these groups. But without jobs and the resulting income streams, the 
members [of that demographic group] demonstrate a lower propensity to form new households. 
Some move home after college; others double-up. In both cases, a keystone of rental demand 
softens, resulting in lower apartment occupancy and rental rates.” 
 
 
Chart data provided by Shirley Layne, Powell Valuation Inc 
 
 
As clearly demonstrated in the chart above, there is a high degree of correlation between 
unemployment rates and vacancy rates. The greatest concentration of vacancies in newer 
projects is in two-bedroom, two-bathroom units (exceeding 8 percent vacancy), while two-
bedroom, one-bathroom units have the highest rate in seasoned properties (exceeding 5 
percent vacancy). This is telling for the overall market in that these unit types represent the 
greatest number of total units in their respective categories. Non-stabilized projects completed 
in 2008 and 2009 are reporting 20-50 percent vacancy rates and are finding it difficult to 
obtain permanent financing. 
 
There is speculation that much vacancy is due to renters moving into homeownership. One 
should hesitate to place much weight on that theory. Although interest rates remain low and 
there is the first time home buyer tax credit available for purchases through December 1, 2009, 
potential homebuyers need to be employed, need to have a downpayment saved and need to 
qualify in today’s new lending environment. The barriers to entry as a homebuyer are much 
higher today than at the market’s peak in 2007. 
 
As vacancies have escalated, market rents have flattened with little change from 2008. Two-
bedroom, one-bathroom rents in seasoned properties range from $464 in East Salem to $659 
in Keizer. Two-bedroom, two-bathroom rents in newer properties range from $678 in East 
Salem to $765 in Southeast Salem. Projects in a rent up period offer two-bedroom floor plans 
from $725 at Santiam Village in East Salem to $875 at Hawks Point in Keizer. Concessions 
have not dramatically affected rent collection year-to-date, but watch for a greater impact on 
economic rent collection (i.e. gross rent, less vacancy, less concessions) in 2010.   
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Summary 
 
Economic headlines have been anticipating the bottoming out of the recession. However, for 
the next 12 to 36 months, the bottom will be rocky for multifamily investors as anticipated: 
• by the acceleration of delinquency rates in the collateralized mortgage-backed securities 
(CMBS) universe; 
• by the resetting of partial interest-only loans;  
• by the failure of pro forma loans to stabilize;  
• by the threat of loans reaching maturity, then not qualifying for a large enough 
refinancing to retire existing debt; and 
• by vacancy rates continuing to climb to match high unemployment rates during a 
projected long, jobless recovery from the current recession. 
 
Capitalization rates will continue to rise as nonperforming assets reach the market and income 
will suffer due to pressure on rents from concessions and ongoing vacancy. Finally, apartment 
sales will continue to lag due to the difficulty of obtaining financing and the remaining gap 
between buyer and seller expectations of value. 
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Salem Retail Report  
 
Jennifer Martin, CCIM, Senior Advisor, Sperry Van Ness Commercial Advisors 
 
Nationally, we have been in a 
recession for at least 19 months.  
While most experts expect that the 
national economy will bottom out 
by the end of 2009, Oregon usually 
lags other parts of the nation in 
entering and exiting recessionary 
periods.  The retail sector is also 
victim to this trend, as most 
industry analysts forecast another 
one to two years before a full 
recovery of the retail sector. 
 
Consumers are spending their 
incomes on essential goods and 
services while increasing their 
savings rates, but industry obs-
ervers contend that they will spend 
money on discretionary items if 
they perceive value.  Therefore, 
discount retailers and drugstore 
chain sales are faring well in this 
economy up 4.1 percent and 1.3 
percent respectively year over year 
from July 2008-July 2009, while 
luxury apparel sales are down 12.5 
percent for the same period, 
according to Peter Sharpe, 
president of commercial developer 
Cadillac-Fairview Corporation and 
chair of the International Council of 
Shopping Centers [ICSC].  
 
Lower food prices are exacerbating 
the lack of sales growth.  Nation-
ally, 2,800 chain stores have closed 
during the first six months of 2009, 
compared to 3,200 during the first 
six months of 2008 according to 
ICSC research. ICSC experts 
predict an overall sales growth rate 
in retail of 0.3% during 2009, and a 
3.5% growth in 2010. 
 
Locally, retailers are feeling the pinch of less consumer spending.  Reports of sales declines by 
local retail and restaurant owners in the Salem/Keizer market are fairly standard.  Expansion 
has come to a halt as most retail owners’ focus has turned to sustaining current operations 
and analyzing efficiency to ensure they can ride out this recession.  This lack of consumer 
spending, and inward focus of owners has negatively affected local retail vacancy rates.  
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Overall, the Salem/Keizer retail vacancy rate was 15.07 percent at the end of 2008, based on a 
survey size of almost 4,000,000 square feet, not including regional malls Salem Center and 
Lancaster Mall, each containing approximately 650,000 square feet. The Salem vacancy rate 
was far above a healthy industry rate of 8-10 percent.   At the end of the second quarter, 2009, 
that rate had risen to 18.27 percent.  This represents a negative absorption of over 120,000 
square feet.  The closures of Circuit City (30,763 square feet) and local furniture retailer Home 
and Dining Collections (30,000 square feet) caused most of this decline. 
  
There are ten mid- and large-box retail spaces (over 20,000 square feet) available in the 
Salem/Keizer area.  Reports by Donahue Schriber, owners of Keizer Station, indicate that the 
releasing of the former Wickes and Party Depot spaces is likely to occur in the near term.  
Additionally, Dick’s Sporting Goods is going to backfill the Joe’s [formerly G.I. Joe’s] location on 
Lancaster Drive. Unfortunately, there are few retailers in the marketplace who have the size 
requirements to fill many of the 20-40,000 square foot vacancies.  
 
 
 
On a sector-by-sector basis, no one in the local marketplace is immune from decreased 
spending by consumers and lack of expansion by retailers.  The CBD has a current vacancy 
rate of almost 20 percent, led largely by the lack of absorption of the recently remodeled former 
Anderson’s Sporting Goods and the Metropolitan Building.  Ongoing vacancy at Liberty Plaza 
also negatively affects the vacancy rate. 
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In South Salem, the vacancy rate is up about 1.5 percent from year-end to a current level of 
15.8 percent. The closing of a stationery store and the addition of a new retail/office mixed-use 
project called Candalaria Crossing, which has only reached approximately 30 percent 
occupancy are the main causes of the increase. The addition of the recently relocated St. 
Vincent dePaul Thrift Store from South Salem to Lancaster Drive further hampers occupancies 
and increases vacancies in the South Salem area.  
 
In West Salem, the retail service area is relatively small so the large vacancy at Oak Hills 
(Safeway) on Edgewater is the main reason for the above-market vacancy of 17 percent. 
Owners are currently remodeling and analyzing several tenants interested in some or all of the 
vacant space.   
 
In the East Salem retail area, the vacancy is up to 19.4 percent from year-end’s 17 percent. 
The continuing vacancy of five large retail spaces is the reason the vacancy is so high.   
 
In the North Salem/Keizer sector, the vacancy rate of almost 19 percent can almost solely be 
attributed to the vacancies at Keizer Station.  There are numerous smaller vacancies along 
River Road, most of which have been available for more than a year. 
 
Over the past six months, very few retail lease deals have been consummated as compared to 
the leasing velocity of the marketplace during 2006 and 2007.  There are a number of start-up 
types of businesses or first-time retail business owners analyzing the marketplace.  Healthy 
retailers looking to out-position their struggling competition are also prevalent in the 
marketplace.  
 
However, deals are taking much longer to complete due to a variety of reasons.  First, tenants 
who rely heavily on national news reports believe they can obtain lease rates and terms that 
would put most landlords out of business.  Tenants fail to understand the relationship between 
what they can (or will) pay and a landlord’s access to capital.  Conversely, landlords in some 
cases are failing to realize that qualified tenants are difficult to find in this economy and that it 
may be a smart decision to leave a few dollars on the table to ensure a stabilized future income 
stream. 
 
Unfortunately, lack of capital reserves, and/or lack of access to capital by both landlords and 
tenants, is also affecting deal volume.  Start-up capital for inventory and working capital is not 
plentiful, and landlords do not typically have reserves for tenant improvements because they 
came to rely on financing for those costs during the time when lenders were happily providing 
funds for those uses. 
 
The Salem/Keizer market is not unique in its struggle to right the retail ship.  In order to do so, 
a number of market perceptions need to be corrected.  First, landlord and tenant expectations 
need to come in line with a new normal commercial real estate market condition.  Comparing 
the quality of space and the lease rates of 18-36 months ago to justify today’s asking rates will 
only delay recovery.  Furthermore, tenants need to realize that landlords need to make a profit, 
albeit smaller than the profit realized just a short time ago.  The capital markets also need to 
improve so that both qualified landlords and tenants can access needed capital for successful 
ventures.   
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Big Box Reuse 
April Chastain, RMLS Fellow & Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
  
The current recession poses new opportunities as well as challenges.  With the retail market 
contracting, there are a number of big box stores that have become vacant.  According to third 
quarter reports by Norris Beggs & Simpson, Portland currently has an 8 percent overall retail 
vacancy, which equals 3,481,017 SF of vacant retail space. A number of retailers have gone 
bankrupt during this recession, two of which have completely liquidated their assets and 
closed their doors, Linens-n-Things and Joe’s Sports & Outdoors.    
 
Portland has its share of big box stores, although the situation here is a little different than 
those faced by other cities in the nation.  Empty boxes may present an opportunity for national 
chains to enter the market, according to an article in the Portland Business Journal1.  In 
January of 2009, when it was written, there were 11 empty big box stores in the area, 
“including four former Linen’s N’ Things stores, three Shoe Pavilions, two Levitz Furniture 
stores, a Mervyns and a Wickes furniture store”.  More vacancies were expected.  Some have 
found temporary fillers, such as Linens N’ Things on SE 82nd, allowing The Spirit of Halloween 
store to occupy part of the building. The article says that Portland has too many smaller big 
boxes, defined as 100,000 SF and below, which do not attract national chains that typically 
require retail spaces of 150,000 SF and larger.   
 
Since that article was written, Joe’s Sports & Outdoors was liquidated and closed, although 
Dick’s Sporting Goods has leased three of the vacant stores throughout the metropolitan area.  
According to Norris, Beggs & Simpson, the third quarter retail vacancy moved up a whole 
percentage point over last quarter with 365,818 SF of newly vacated space.  Of the submarkets 
in the Portland metropolitan region, Vancouver has the highest vacancy at 11.6 percent, which 
equals 1,000,518 SF of vacant retail space.  The Southwest, which includes Washington 
Square, has 859,908 SF available with an 8.4 percent vacancy rate.  The Southeast/East 
Clackamas submarket has the lowest vacancy rate at 4.3 percent and 228,127 SF of vacant 
retail space.  
 
Julia Christensen’s book, Big Box Reuse, 
published in 2008 by MIT, suggests some 
possible solutions to the glut of vacant 
retail big box stores. Christensen’s 
interest in big box reuse and research for 
the book began before the Great 
Recession.  Substantially more big-box 
stores may now be vacant without other 
tenants available to re-rent the buildings. 
However, the book does offer some insight 
into the challenges facing communities as 
they search for ways out of the recession.  
From interviews on NPR to a scathing 
review by Martin Zimmerman in Urban 
Land, the book is at least sparking 
conversation about what to do with 
unwanted big box stores, a conversation 
that may be provoking communities to try 
to prevent them in the first place, rather 
than have to deal with their short-lived 
                                                
1 http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2009/01/05/story1.html# 
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utility, lack of architectural 
inspiration, and negative env-
ironmental impacts. That 
aside, Christensen illustrates 
some intriguing reuses for big 
box stores across the nation.  
She chronicles several, civic 
and community uses, includ-
ing several schools that have 
been adapted to fit into the 
vacant buildings.  
  
Christensen’s website2 makes 
use of an interactive map to 
provide insight into several of 
the places she visited in the 
course of writing her book.  It 
includes three schools, several 
apartments, a library, a justice 
center, a medical center and 
even a Spam Museum.  She admires the creativity of people trying to decide what to do with 
these buildings. She also notes that most of these vacant buildings are not abandoned because 
the retailer goes bankrupt, but rather simply because it builds a bigger, better box nearby, 
frequently within a mile.  
 
 
In Kentucky a group of four doctors privately 
renovated a Wal-Mart into The Central Kentucky 
Comprehensive Medical Center.  The $4 million 
dollar renovation provides 44,000 SF of space, 
which is home to 88 examination rooms, a 
chiropractic suite, a wellness center, a physical 
therapy center with small pool and an indoor 
walking track, among a variety of other services 
and amenities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christensen’s website also shows the Sugar 
Creek Charter School in Charlotte, NC, 
which is housed in an old K-Mart that is 
being renovated in stages.  The school 
moved into half of the site in 2000 and 
plans to add a gym, cafeteria and more 
classrooms, as time and money allow.  The 
layout of the hallways of the new school can 
be seen following the aisle layout of the old 
K-Mart to take advantage of the original 
wiring.  The school added skylights to let 
natural light into the building.  
                                                
2http://www.bigboxreuse.com/ 
The Spam Museum, a 32,000SF renovated K-Mart which also houses the corporate 
headquarters 
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A local example of a retail facility converting to another use can be found in Vancouver.  Mastro 
Properties3 based in Seattle, renovated a 200,000-square-foot shopping center into an office 
plaza, which it leased to several state agencies, the U.S. Postal Service, Health Experience A.C. 
and Columbia Credit Union. In 2004, Mastro Properties sold the Town Plaza Business Center 
in Vancouver to Tower Mall LLC for $27 million.  
 
 
 
Christensen’s book explores Wal-Mart’s business model, which relies on vacating the first 
round of stores after building a bigger store nearby, because it is cheaper to build a new store 
than to close and lose sales during renovation.   A chart from the book shows that Wal-Mart 
built 1,980 supercenters between 1995 and 2006.  The number of discount stores decreased 
from 1,990 to 1,209 in that same time period.  
 
Another way Wal-Mart has been influencing retail vacancy is through the use of non-
competition clauses in the original leases that do not allow other retailers, expressly including 
K-Marts, to reuse the buildings. The old buildings then remain as real estate placeholders 
staving off the competition.  This has led many communities to invest in institutional reuses.  
Since libraries, schools and community centers do not compete with retailers, they can take 
over the lease of the property without violating the non-competition clause.  Christensen 
decries the ethical implications of building these big boxes in the first place, since they pose 
large environmental impacts during construction, cannot function without cars and must 
create huge parking lots.  However, reusing the big-box buildings, while not advancing smart 
growth principles of compact development, is considered by her to be greener than simply 
demolishing them to build others.  The problem, she contends, lies in the underlying 
infrastructure and business models that promote sprawling suburban development.   
 
In a June 2009 Urban Land magazine article, Jeffrey Spivak4  starts from the premise that 
“communities would prefer not to get stuck with empty big boxes in the first place.”  He notes 
that many communities are taking preventive measures to try to promote a different building 
model by imposing regulation such as:  
 
• Setting a size limit on retail buildings;  
• Establishing stricter design standards, and 
                                                
3 “Mastro sells Vancouver office plaza,” Portland Business Journal, January 19, 2004. 
4 “Reusing Big Boxes,” Urban Land, June 2009. P.56 et. seq. 
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• Requiring a demolition bond to provide money for razing a big box if it remains vacant 
for a prescribed period. 
 
Another book, “Retrofitting Suburbia,” by Ellen Dunham-Jones and June Williamson5, notes a 
retail trend in the United States as a result of overbuilding retail space as part of the 
leapfrogging pattern of development that has occurred as cities have spread farther from their 
cores.  They note that in 1986 there were 15 square feet of retail space per person, increasing 
20 percent to 20 square feet per person in 2003.  Canada averages 13 square feet per person, 
Australia 6.5 square feet and Sweden (the highest in Europe) boasts a mere three square feet 
per person. 
 
The Portland metropolitan area currently has a total inventory of 43,654,248 SF of retail space, 
although 3,481,017 square feet of it currently sit vacant, according to a report by Norris Beggs 
& Simpson.  According to the American Community Survey, the projected population for 2008 
for the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area (Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton) was 2,209,114.   
 
Assuming that the two measurements cover approximately the same area, Portland would have 
19.8 square feet of total retail space per person, approximately the same as the national 
average in 2003.  See the following maps for comparison.  It seems that the census area 
encompasses more of the surrounding rural area than the retail submarket map, which would 
suggest that the actual ratio of retail space per person is even larger, although the residents 
counted in the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area probably shop to some extent within the 
retail area shown. 
    
 
 
How will the consolidation of retail space as a result of the Great Recession, the demise of 
many big box retailers and the paucity of retailers to occupy the vacated space, particularly in 
the 25,000 to 100,000 square foot range impact the reuse of these vacant retail spaces?  
Inevitably retailers will consolidate, as retail likes to be near retail.  It seems that the quicker 
this happens the better off retailers will be.  Of course there will be winners and losers.  Retail 
areas that lose tenants could consider their options: non-retail tenants or land banking for 
future redevelopment.   
Schools, hospitals, and clinics have minimal funds if any for expansion right now. In fact the 
Portland Public Schools District has already consolidated some schools and may consolidate 
others. The current healthcare debate may bring opportunities, depending on what legislation, 
if any comes out of Congress.  Other options to fill vacant retail spaces include: industrial 
incubators, fitness centers, daycare centers, senior centers and government offices.  If 
healthcare in general shifts toward preventive services and general health maintenance, then 
                                                
5 “Repurpose-Driven Life,” The New York Times, June, 2009  
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there may be a greater need for wellness and community centers promoting exercise programs. 
Remote retail locations might even be considered for low-security detention facilities.   
Metropolitan and local governments could implement policies that encourage retail 
consolidation near transit centers and along transit lines, and allow for a greater mix of uses, 
encouraging more office and residential within commercial zones.  The UGB in Portland and 
other Oregon cities will probably cause more redevelopment and re-use to occur than in other 
states, since development opportunities and parcels will be more limited.  Communities could 
also look to purchase the land, assemble larger pieces and plan to redevelop it in the future 
when the time is right and needs are more apparent and economically feasible.  
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Retail Market Analysis 
 
By April Chastain, Certificate of Real Estate Development Graduate Student & RMLS 
Fellow 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Norris, Beggs & Simpson reports an increase in metro-wide retail vacancy, reaching 8 percent 
this quarter.  Joe's Sports & Outdoors played a large part in that vacancy, although Dick's 
Sporting Goods has leased three of the buildings vacated by Joe's.  A new Winco under 
construction at Bowyer Marketplace in Clark County is expected to be delivered in June 2010.  
Costco is also planning a new 154,701 SF building in Clark County on Northeast 192nd. 
 
NBS reports downtown/central city vacancy reaching 9.8% with 250,765 square feet of retail 
space available for lease.  That is topped only by Vancouver with an 11.6% vacancy rate and 
over 1,000,578 available for lease and another 107,800 square feet under construction. 
 
Lloyd Center was to be sold for $192 million, or $137 per square foot, which would have 
included the $127.5 million mortgage, according to the DJC1.  It would have been purchased 
by Merlone Geier Partners, based in California, from Glimcher Realty Trust of Columbus, Ohio. 
However, Merlone Geier terminated the sale agreement, which it could do at its sole discretion 
before September 30, 2009. CoStar reports that Glimcher acquired Lloyd Center from SI-Lloyd 
Associates for $167 million, when it was 85% occupied and tenant sales were about $325 per 
square foot. At the end of 2008, Glimcher, reported 94.7% occupancy at Lloyd Center and $379 
per square foot in tenant sales.  
 
General Growth Properties, which owns Pioneer Place, Clackamas Town Center, Salem Center, 
Rogue Valley Mall in Medford, and Gateway Mall in Springfield filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in April. The decision to pursue reorganization under chapter 11 came after unsuccessful 
efforts to refinance or extend maturing debt outside of chapter 11. 
 
 
Source:  Norris, Beggs & Simpson Retail office report - Third quarter 2009 
 
 
 
                                                
1 “Lloyd Center sold for $192M”, Daily Journal of Commerce, September 15, 2009. 
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Source:  Norris, Beggs & Simpson Retail office report - Third quarter 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Norris, Beggs & Simpson Retail office report - Third quarter 2009 
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Source:  Norris, Beggs & Simpson Retail office report - Third quarter 2009 
 
 
 
 
According to the DJC2  several downtown restaurants have closed recently, leaving vacancies 
that are expected to remain so for some time.  They tend to be 4,000 to 10,000 SF, sizes which 
might attract national chains, but few national chains are currently expanding.  See the 
following map for vacancies as of September, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[See aerial photograph on the next page.] 
 
                                                
2 “Dining dip leaves space”, DJC, September 11, 2009. 
Name SF Available 
McCormick & Schmick'’s Seafood  9,400 
Kincaid's Fish, Steak and Chophouse 8,000 
Stanford’s at RiverPlace 7,030 
Newport Seafood Grill 3,800 
Pinnacle Pavilion 4,410 
Palomino Restaurant 7,800 
R Palate 1,975 
Harrison Restaurant (Tondero) 8,700 
Jax Restaurant 3,250 
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       Figure 1.  Restaurant Vacancies as of September 11, 2009. 
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Office Market Analysis 
April Chastain, RMLS Fellow & Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
Portland Office Market 
 
 
The office market has worsened this quarter over last.  The CBD is feeling the impacts with 
Laika Animation studios leaving 83,676 SF in the Leland James building and Daimler trying to 
sublease 100,000 SF in Montgomery Park, as reported by Norris Beggs & Simpson.  CB 
Richard Ellis [CBRE] believes that the commercial real estate market has not yet hit bottom 
and will not start to recuperate until the unemployment rate decreases.  It notes that the 
Oregon’s unemployment rate continues to fluctuate:  12.1% in the second quarter 11.1% in 
July, 11.6% in August.  This time a year ago an estimated 67,900 people were unemployed 
compared to 139,900 currently unemployed.  However, CBRE also states that the office market 
this quarter experienced only 290,562 SF of negative net absorption, which is a 44% 
improvement over last quarter’s 522,785 SF of negative net absorption.   
 
Analysis by Grubb & Ellis predicts that the office market is near the bottom with a slowing in 
the decline.  It also notes that effective rental rates declined by more than 10 percent.  Analysis 
by Colliers International predicts a “slow and prolonged recovery in the second half of next year 
and into 2011” for the commercial real estate market due to lack of job growth, although other 
economic indicators show signs of improvement. 
 
  
 
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Second Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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OFFICE  Q3-091 CB Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman 
& 
Wakefield 
Grubb 
& Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-Wide Vacancy 15% 15.9% 14% 17% 15.7% 
Previous Quarter 14% 14.9% 14% 16% 14.6% 
Third Quarter 2008 10.7% 11.9% 11.6% 13.4% 11.8% 
Third Quarter 2007 10.9% 11.5% 11.7% 13.0% 11.6% 
CBD and Downtown Vacancy 10.0% 11.7% 9.8% 11.1% 10.6% 
Previous Quarter 8.9% 10.9% 8.5% 10.3% 9.6% 
Third Quarter 2008 7.6% 8.5% 7.6% 9.0% 8.1% 
Third Quarter 2007 8.2% 9.2% 8.3% 10.3% 8.8% 
CBD Class A Vacancy 6.3% 9.0% 6.2% 6.7% 6.5% 
Previous Quarter 5.4% 8.6% 6.1% 6.3% 6.2% 
Third Quarter 2008 4.6% 5.6% 4.8% 5.6% 5.2% 
Third Quarter 2007 5.0% 5.9% 5.2% 5.9% 5.6% 
CBD Class A Asking Rents N/A $25.79  $25.86 N/A $25.83 
Previous Quarter N/A $26.20  $24.68 N/A $25.44 
Third Quarter 2008 $26.91 $26.61 $26.48 N/A $26.61 
Third Quarter 2007 $24.17 $25.27 $25.14 N/A $25.14 
Suburban Vacancy 20.3% 19.9% 17.4% 20.2% 20.1% 
Previous Quarter 19.3% 18.7% 18.1% 19.1% 18.9% 
Third Quarter 2008 13.6% 15.3% 14.0% 15.6% 14.7% 
Third Quarter 2007 13.4% 13.7% 13.8% 14.9% 13.8% 
Suburban Class A Vacancy N/A 22.6% 20.6% 22.6% 22.6% 
Previous Quarter N/A 20.3% 19.5% N/A 19.9% 
Third Quarter 2008 N/A 15.8% 15.6% N/A 15.7% 
Third Quarter 2007 N/A 13.7% 10.5% N/A 12.1% 
Suburban Class A Asking Rents N/A $24.04  $23.84  N/A $23.94 
Previous Quarter N/A $23.59  $23.65  N/A $23.62 
Third Quarter 2008 N/A $24.46  $24.11  N/A $24.29  
Third Quarter 2007 N/A $23.79  $24.34  N/A $24.07  
Source:  CB Richard Ellis, Cushman & Wakefield, Grubb & Ellis, Norris, Beggs & Simpson Quarterly Reports and 
Statistical Reports, First Quarter 2009. 
 
 
According to this summary chart the CBD Class A vacancy rate remains fairly stable and is 
much lower than the overall CBD vacancy rate which has now crossed the 10% mark.  The 
Suburban Class A market, on the other hand, has higher vacancy rates than the overall 
suburban market, probably due to the impacts of employment declines in the financial sector 
in the Kruse Way corridor and possibly a shift toward a more central location by stable 
companies that are taking advantage of the downturn to lock in leases in prime locations.  
Both the CBD and the suburban submarkets have seen declines in rent since the third quarter 
of 2008, but have increased over the previous quarter. 
                                                
1 Vacancy rates above include subleases except those reported by CBRE, and NBS, which report direct vacancies.  CBD figures include close-in 
neighborhoods, except Class A figures reported by CBRE.  All rents are full service.  All other suburban figures include Vancouver. 
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Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
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CBD Trends 
 
CBD Class A is only 6.68% vacant, according to 
Norris Beggs & Simpson, with the KOIN center 
gaining two new tenants, ECONorthwest and Willis 
of Oregon.  An August article in the Wall Street 
Journal2 explains the recent plight of the KOIN 
Center.  Calpers and CommonWealth Partners LLC, 
joint owners of the office portion of the building, 
defaulted on the mortgage and were sued by the 
mortgage providers New York Life Insurance Co.  
Calpers has decided to walk away from its 
investment, which was purchased at the peak in 
2007 for $109 million, not including the upper 11 
floors of condominiums.  The troubles are due to insufficient cash flow caused by higher than 
expected vacancies.  The last straw may have come when the law firm Ater Wynne LLP vacated 
50,000 SF in the building relocating to the Pearl.   
 
CB Richard Ellis notes that this is the first time since the third quarter of 2006 that the overall 
downtown submarkets have gone over a 10% vacancy rate.  It also notes that overall asking 
rates in the CBD remain steady at $22.40/SF. The summary chart above shows a median 
asking rental rate of $25.83 for Class A in the CBD.  Grubb & Ellis notes that 29,000 SF of 
sublease space was taken off the market this quarter bringing the year-to-date total to 277,996 
SF of available sublease space in the CBD.  It also reports that the CBD accounted for 97% of 
the region’s office space currently under construction but is not likely to see new projects 
anytime soon.    
 
Grubb & Ellis report an opportunity for the CBD to absorb some of this new construction by 
the General Services Administration (GSA), which is actively looking for space, generally needs 
larger spaces, and tends to locate downtown in LEED-certified buildings.  Colliers International 
confirms this trend reporting that the GSA signed a lease for 37,000 SF of the 62,000 SF 
currently under construction in the Overton Building in the Pearl, which should be delivered 
next summer.  Collier’s also reports that Shorenstein is actively negotiating with the federal 
government for lease of its new First & Main office building, which will soon add 348,000 SF to 
the market.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 “Calpers Takes Another Property Hit”, Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2009. 
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland Third Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland Third Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland Third Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Source:  Cushman & Wakefield, Portland Third Quarter 2009, Overall Office Summary. 
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Suburbs:  
Vacancy in the suburbs continues to 
increase, rising to 20.1% median rate as 
shown in the brokerage report summary.  
CBRE notes that the suburban submarkets 
have not seen 20% vacancy since the end of 
2001, with average asking rates continuing to 
decline.  Norris Beggs & Simpson notes that 
the delivery of 92,754 SF of Class A office 
space at Cascade Station I, which remains 
entirely vacant, increased the vacancy of the 
North/Northeast submarket by nearly nine 
percentage points.  The west side continues to 
show the greatest vacancy with Hillsboro at 
nearly 30%, according to CBRE. 
Grubb & Ellis reports high vacancy in the 
Sunset Corridor and expects that the Kruse 
Way corridor will continue to see vacancy 
increase as tenants who have signed leases 
move to other areas.  According to Grubb & 
Ellis, the Tualatin/Wilsonville submarket still 
ranks the highest in percentage of vacancy, 
but the amount of vacant space is only a third 
of the amount of vacant space found in the 
fifth ranked Washington Square/Kruse Way 
submarket.  Beaverton saw a 6% decline in 
vacancy since last quarter.  
*
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report,       
Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
Total Vacancy for Select Suburban Submarkets   
Submarket 
Current 
Market 
Size    
(Sq. Ft.) 
2Q 08 
Vacancy 
3Q 08 
Vacancy 
4Q 08   
Vacancy 
1Q 09   
Vacancy 
2Q 09   
Vacancy 
3Q 09   
Vacancy 
% 
change 
from 
last 
quarter  
Current 
Vacancy 
(sqft) 
Washington 
Square/ Kruse Way 
     
6,205,488  13.8% 13.5% 14.7% 16.3% 19.6% 20.6% 5.1% 1,275,337 
Sunset Corridor 
     
4,195,633  21.2% 22.3% 22.3% 25.3% 25.6% 27.4% 7.0% 1,149,184 
Beaverton 
     
3,509,988  17.2% 16.9% 15.4% 16.5% 16.8% 15.8% -6.0% 555,926 
Eastside 
     
2,736,015  6.7% 8.2% 8.2% 7.6% 7.4% 7.4% 0.0% 213,621 
Johns 
Landing/Barber 
Blvd. 
1,704,248 13.3% 14.2% 13.1% 13.9% 14.5% 14.8% 2.1% 251,537 
Tualatin/Wilsonville 1,600,875 21.9% 28.7% 27.3% 26.1% 26.9% 27.9% 3.7% 446,483 
*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
Suburban Office Submarkets Ranked by Highest 
Percent of Vacancy 
Submarket Rank 
Vacancy 
Rate 
Camas       3  25% 
Cascade Park       7  16.9% 
Vancouver     10  14.7% 
Clackamas Sunnyside     13  10.40% 
Clark Co. Outlying     11  14.1% 
Columbia Corridor       4  23.1% 
Eastside     16  7.4% 
Hazel Dell/Salmon Creek     17  6.2% 
Johns Landing/Barbur Blvd       9  14.8% 
Northwest     15  7.5% 
Orchards       6  20.3% 
St. Johns/Central Vancouver     12  10.8% 
Sunset Corridor       2  27.4% 
SW/Beaverton/Sylvan       8  15.8% 
Tualatin/Wilsonville       1  27.9% 
Vancouver Mall     14  9.90% 
Washington Sq/Kruse Way       5  20.6% 
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*Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Co., Office Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Lease Transactions Q3 2009   
Lessee Property Submarket 
Size 
(SF) 
Wells Fargo (renewal) Montgomery Park Portland 
  
128,032  
Cascade Education LLC 
(renewal) 8909 Building Portland 47,033 
Genesis Financial Solutions Creekside Corporate Park Central 217 27,862 
Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance 847 NE 19th Ave Lloyd District 24,405 
Hampton Management 
(renewal) 9600 Building Portland 24,056 
InFocus Triangle Corporate Park Tigard 17,267 
Elynx Ltd. Creekside Corporate Park Central 217 12,705 
Source:  CB Richard Ellis, MarketView Third Quarter 2009 Office Report, Norris, Beggs and Simpson,  
"Market Summaries 3Q09", Cushman and Wakefield, "MarketBeat 3Q09", Grubb & Ellis, "Office Trends Report 
3Q09" 
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Hotel Market Analysis 
 
By April Chastain, Certificate of Real Estate Development Graduate Student & 
RMLS Fellow 
 
According to the Daily Journal of Commerce (DJC)1, the occupancy rate of Portland's hotels 
has fallen 12 percent in 2009.  So far this year, the overall occupancy rate stands at 63 
percent.  The hotel market supply expanded by more than 979 rooms downtown alone during 
the boom with the addition of several new hotels:  the 173-room Hotel Modera, the 331-room 
Nines, the 256-room Courtyard by Marriott, the 140-room Fifty, the 79-room Ace Hotel plus 
suburban hotels like the 136-room Aloft Hotel at Cascade Station to name a few.  Nationally, 
revenue per available room (RevPAR) is down 18.3 percent.   
 
The impact of the new supply, coupled with reduced travel due to the 
Great Recession, has exacted a toll on hotel owners and operators. 
According to the DJC2, Hilton has made plans to close the downtown 
Hilton Hotel for over four weeks, one week in November, one week in 
December and two weeks in January, in order to cut costs.  
Hotwire.com3 ranked Portland's hotel market as experiencing the fifth 
largest decline nationally in hotel prices.  As of the first week in 
September, room rates are down 20% compared with last year, to an 
average three-star rate of only $57 per night.  Due to these problems 
in the hotel market, local firms are concerned that distressed hotels 
may be purchased by so-called vulture investment firms.   
 
The depth of the recession in the 
hotel market, coupled with its 
accelerating costs and required 
public subsidies, have stymied 
plans to develop a 600-room Westin 
headquarters hotel at the Oregon 
Convention Center4.  The hotel was 
to have been part of a plan to 
bolster events at the Oregon 
Convention Center (OCC) on land 
acquired by the PDC to the east of 
the OCC on N.E. Martin Luther King 
Jr. Blvd. The 23-story, $200+ 
million project would have been 
paid for in part by funds from the 
Portland Metro Visitors Development Fund, funded by hotel room taxes. The Portland Mayor, 
Metro president and Multnomah County Chair decided in September not to extend a 
development agreement with the hotel's developers. 
 
The CoStar Group5 reports that some hotel chains are looking to raise money in order to 
acquire properties in distress.  Hyatt Hotels Corp. and DiamondRock Hospitality Co. are both 
making moves to raise capital in order to add hotels to their portfolio.  Hotel executives 
                                                
1 “Portland hotels: plenty of rooms available”, Daily Journal of Commerce, October 7, 2009. 
2 “Union:  Downtown Hilton plans shutdown”, DJC, September 1, 2009. 
3 “Hotel rates falling fast in Portland “, Portland  Business Journal, September 23, 2009 
4 “Falling demand sinks HQ hotel”, DJC, September 21, 2009. 
5 “Hotels:  Don’t Buy Them Now, But Start Looking”, CoStar Group, October 21, 2009. 
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interviewed for the article expect to see more transactions in 2010, with over $30 billion of 
hotel collateralized mortgage-backed securities’ (CMBS) debt coming due through 2014 and 
with $8 billion already unable to meet debt service.  
 
Local hotels may have some relief from the weak market as attendees of the upcoming 
supercomputing convention in November will reportedly be accommodated at 31 different 
hotels in the area.   
 
A preliminary report by The Dundon Company shows an increase of four hotels in the Portland 
Metropolitan Area since March.  One hotel was deleted due to a decrease in price.  Three hotels 
are currently under construction and four more are in the planning stages.  Since March of 
2009, 92 hotels are quoting a higher nightly rate with an average increase of $14.33.  Sixty-
three hotels are quoting a lower corporate rate averaging $10.66 less per night.  Eighteen 
hotels maintain the same rate, for a total of 176 hotels in the area that charge a corporate rate 
of more than $50 per night. 
 
 
Source:  "Portland Hotel Survey, March 2009", The Dundon Company, LLC 
 
 
 
 
Source:  "Portland Hotel Survey, September 2009", The Dundon Company, LLC 
*Suburban Eastside, 25 rooms deleted due to drop in price 
 
 
September, 2009 
Number 
of 
Hotels 
Total 
Rooms 
Available 
Rooms 
Under 
Construction 
Rooms 
Planned for 
Development 
Rooms 
Closed for 
renovation 
Rooms 
Added/ 
Deleted 
Suburban Westside 46 4941 - 366 - 124 
Downtown 31 5,510 - 66 - 256 
Suburban Eastside* 40 3,914 - - - -25 
Int'l Airport 26 3,407 370 - - - 
Vancouver WA 22 2,139 - - - 132 
Rose Quarter/Lloyd Center 12 1,693 - - - - 
Metropolitan Total 176 21,604 370 432 0 487 
Suburban Westside: Beaverton, Sunset Corridor, Hillsboro, Lake Oswego, Tualatin,Tigard, & Wilsonville. 
Downtown Portland includes Downtown, John’s Landing, Uptown and Northwest Industrial 
Suburban Eastside includes Jantzen Beach, Gresham, Troutdale, Clackamas, Oregon City and Milwaukie 
Source:  "Portland Hotel Survey, March 2009", The Dundon Company, LLC 
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Portland Industrial Market 
April Chastain, RMLS Fellow & Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
 
 
 
 
The industrial sector remains depressed.  Colliers International reports a vacancy rate of 8.3% 
and a negative net absorption of 776,352 SF.  It expects vacancy to continue to increase, 
reaching the 12-13% rate by mid-to-late 2010.  As in the office sector, stagnant job growth will 
hinder recovery.  Colliers also predicts potential distress for landlords who have taken 
significant rental reductions, at 20-30% below pro forma rental projections, in order to secure 
and retain tenants.  This may lead to reduced building values and loan repayment troubles in 
the future.  However, this also indicates that the market may be bottoming out.   
 
 
Some positive news came when Daimler Trucks North America announced that it would not 
leave its Swan Island location as it procured a government contract for military vehicles, 
preserving about 650 jobs.  CB Richard Ellis notes that if awarded a DOE grant, ReVolt 
Technology will locate its US headquarters in Portland hiring up to 250 employees in the 
development of rechargeable zinc batteries for electric vehicles.  It also notes that construction 
and manufacturing gained jobs in August, while vacancy has remained nearly flat at 8.1%.  
Norris Beggs & Simpson on the other hand, reports overall vacancies rising a percentage point 
to 14.94% this quarter, with the Southwest 217 vacancy nearly doubling to 24.98%. 
 
 
 
   Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 
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New construction in 2009 has delivered 511,003 SF according to CB Richard Ellis, nearly 85% 
of which is vacant.  The remaining 461,500 SF currently under construction will be occupied 
upon delivery by FedEx and General Pacific.  Norris Beggs & Simpson reports another 150,000 
SF under construction within three smaller buildings in the Southwest I-5 submarket.   
 
CB Richard Ellis reports that shell rates contracted, except in inventory restricted areas such 
as Vancouver and the Southeast where they remain steady.  Case Holland’s 246,228 SF lease 
and HD Supply Utilities’ new lease at Clackamas Station resulted in positive net absorption 
this quarter for the Northeast and Southeast submarkets.   
 
Cushman & Wakefield report that Shin-Etsu, a Japanese solar and computer chip 
manufacturer bought the Hewlett Packard campus in Vancouver.  HP will lease back part of 
the site. 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL    Q3-09 CB Richard 
Ellis 
Cushman 
& 
Wakefield 
Grubb 
& 
Ellis 
Norris, 
Beggs & 
Simpson Median 
Market-wide Vacancy 8.1% 8.3% 8.8% 14.9% 8.6% 
Previous Quarter 8.1% 8.0% 8.5% N/A 8.1% 
Third Quarter 2008 6.1% 6.7% 6.6% N/A 6.6% 
Third Quarter 2007 4.9% 5.0% 5.3% N/A 5.0% 
Warehouse/Distribution 14.0% 8.8% 8.9% N/A 8.9% 
Previous Quarter 14.6% 7.7% 8.6% N/A 8.6% 
Third Quarter 2008 11.97 5.8% 6.7% N/A 6.7% 
Third Quarter 2007 N/A 4.3% 4.8% N/A 4.6% 
R&D/Flex Vacancy 15.1% 10.0% 8.4% 15.7% 12.5% 
Previous Quarter 14.9% 9.6% 7.9% N/A 9.6% 
Third Quarter 2008 12.73 9.5% 6.3% N/A 9.5% 
Third Quarter 2007 N/A 9.2% 7.0% N/A 8.1% 
Asking Monthly Shell Rates $0.39 N/A $0.43 N/A $0.41 
Previous Quarter $0.40 N/A $0.41 N/A $0.41 
Third Quarter 2008 $0.39  N/A $0.42  N/A $0.41 
Third Quarter 2007 $0.37  N/A $0.41  N/A $0.39 
Asking Monthly Flex Rates N/A N/A $0.79 N/A $0.79 
Previous Quarter $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.80 N/A $0.80 
Third Quarter 2008 $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.85 N/A $0.85 
Third Quarter 2007 $0.85-$1.05 N/A $0.83 N/A $0.83 
Source:  Grubb & Ellis, Cushman and Wakefield, Norris, Beggs & Simpson, Quarterly Reports  
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Source:  Colliers International, "The Knowledge Report", Industrial, Third Quarter 2009. 
 
 
*Source:  Grubb & Ellis Co., Industrial Quarterly Report, Third Quarter 2009 
 
Chastain • Industrial Market Analysis  
 
 
 
PSU Center for Real Estate •   Quarterly & Urban Development Journal •4th Quarter 2009 • Page 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Lease Transactions Q3 09   
Industrial       
Tenant Property  (Sq. Ft.) Submarket 
Case New Holland ProLogis Park PDX 246,228 Portland 
Bunzl Distribution 
(renewal) 
Jennifer Distribution 
Center 
127,420 Clackamas 
Aaron Rents (renewal) Rivergate Warehouse 97,625 Portland 
Quantum Resource 
Recovery 
Waterfront Business 
Center 
92,500 Portland 
Biamp Systems 
Corporation 
Nimbus Corporate 
Center 
70,944 Beaverton 
Oregon Electric 
Construction 
1709 SE Third Ave 46,154 Southeast 
 Total 680,871  
 *Source:  NAI Norris Beggs & Simpson, CB Richard Ellis, and Cushman & Wakefield, Industrial Quarterly Reports, 
Third Quarter 2009, and the Portland Business Journal  
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Portland Apartment Market 
Scott Aster, Oregon Association of Realtors [OAR] Fellow 
& Certificate of Real Estate Development Student 
 
 
According to Norris, Beggs & Simpson’s Third Quarter 2009 Multifamily Report, the overall 
multifamily vacancy rate has decreased in the third quarter to 4.62% from 5.03% in the second 
quarter but is still up from 3.76% this time last year. The average rents for the quarter are 
$686 ($0.97/SF) for a 1BR/1BA, $720 ($0.81/SF) for a 2BR/1BA, $876 ($0.85) for a 2BR/2BA 
and $974 ($0.79) for a 3 BR/2BA.  These numbers are up slightly from the previous quarter.  
Average 2BR/2BA new units rent for $1,219 per unit, an increase of $19 over last quarter.  
Seasoned 2 BR/2BA units rent for an average $826 per unit, which is an increase of only $2 
over last quarter.     
 
 
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Third Quarter, 2009,  
*Price per square foot shown in red  
 
 
 
 
The higher vacancy issue appears to be a lagging indicator within this recession as the 
economy’s slow recovery does not appear to be improving occupancy rates.  September vacancy 
numbers reflect 5-7% vacancies across the Portland market, with high areas at 10% and low 
areas at 3%.  Concessions remain commonplace though rental rates have stabilized somewhat.   
The primary cause of the high vacancies is the economic downturn’s strong negative effect on 
renter affordability. 
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*Based on 1BR rate 
**2009 estimated. 
Source:  Brokers, Gary Winkler & Beth DuPont, Colliers multifamily investment, "Portland Multifamily Private Capital 
News, Year End 2008" 
 
 
 
The SE Portland submarket shows the highest total vacancy rate at 5.94%, while Lake 
Oswego/West Linn has the lowest submarket vacancy at 3.61%. However, Lake Oswego has 
the highest new unit vacancy at 8.16% while Vancouver has the lowest new unit vacancy at 
2.78%.  
 
 
 Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Third Quarter, 2009 
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According to Colliers International, the high local unemployment rates are having a strong 
negative impact on vacancies, as shown in the charts below. The rise in the unemployment rate 
from 6.2% in 2008 to 11.3% in 2009 suggests that vacancy rates might continue to rise until 
unemployment levels stabilize and decline.  
 
 
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Third Quarter (2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005), 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Aug 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005)  
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Vacancies are up not necessarily because residents are moving from Portland but also due to 
tenants doubling up, moving in with family, or moving into single-family rental homes.  
According to Mark Barry, condominium conversions are also having an impact on vacancy 
rates.  He estimates a current 2.5 to 3.5 years of inventory in the condominium market.  
 
The threat of fleeing tenants has caused some landlords to offer lower rents, one or two months 
worth of free rent concessions as well as free parking. Colliers International states in its 
midyear report that, “some new buildings even guarantee that if a tenant loses his/her job, 
they can end their lease agreement without penalties, early termination fees or adverse impact 
on credit.” The widespread discounting produces net effective rents, including parking and rent 
concessions in select buildings throughout the metro area, ranging from 5.6% to 16.8% lower.  
      
One of the driving factors behind the vacancy issue is affordability.  According to Colliers 
International, the middle income work force that drives demand for multifamily rental housing 
earns between 50% and 80% of median family income (MFI).  The 2009 MFI for a single person 
in Portland is $49,000.  Assuming rents are a 30% of gross income, the individual could afford 
a monthly rent of between $613 and $980.  Options are very limited within this price range in 
the Portland area as studios and one-bedrooms are between $710 and $740 and higher range 
luxury options are in excess of $1,000. 
 
 
 
  2009 MFI Single Person 
50% MFI Gross Income $24,500 
 Affordability $613 
60% MFI Gross Income $29,400 
 Affordability $735 
80% MFI Gross Income $39,200 
 Affordability $980 
100% MFI Gross Income $49,000 
  Affordability $1,225 
 
Source:  Colliers, "Portland Multifamily Private Capital News, 3rd Quarter 2009" 
 
 
Source:   Norris, Beggs & Simpson "Portland Area Multifamily Report Third Quarter, 2009 
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Norris, Beggs & Simpson’s list of major apartment sale transactions indicates a drastic decline 
in apartment sales over the previous year.  The sum of the purchase prices from the list of the 
seven major sale transactions in NBS’s Third Quarter 2008 Report amounts to $249,523,900.  
This year’s list totals only $9,879,123, or 4% of the previous year’s total.  Thus major 
apartment sales were few and far between in the third quarter of 2009.  Similarly, multifamily 
land sales for future development have also dried up.  However, as NBS indicates in its report, 
it expects sales to accelerate once the availability of financing increases.   
 
Two transactions, as reported by the Portland Business Journal1, took place after the quarter 
ended.  Nevins Adams Lewbell Schell purchased The Colonnade, a 268-unit complex at 20311 
NW Colonnade Drive, Hillsboro for $21.42 million ($79,925/unit).  The same company also 
purchased the Park at Mill Plain, a 352-unit complex at 206 NE 126th Ave, Vancouver, for $23 
million ($65,340/unit). 
 
 
MAJOR SALE TRANSACTIONS         
Buyer Building Price Units Price/Unit Submarket 
NW DPL V, LLC Emerson Apartments $2,659,123 26 $102,274 North/NE Portland 
Kelly and Linda 
Finerty 
Yorktown Gardens 
Apartments $1,660,000 30 $55,333 Gresham/Troutdale 
Fircrest 
Investment, LLC 19511 NE Halsey Street $1,450,000 27 $53,704 North/NE Portland 
Dash 
Investments, 
LLC The Meadows $1,250,000 22 $56,818 Beaverton/Aloha 
Bill and Georgia 
Pappas View North Apartments $1,075,000 20 $53,750 North/NE Portland 
5625 SE 
Gladstone, LLC Triangle Terrace $1,035,000 14 $73,929 Southeast Portland 
Park Place 
Partners, LLC 220-244 NE 143rd Avenue  $750,000 13 $57,692 North/NE Portland 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 “California firm buys apartment complexes for $48M”, Portland Business Journal 
 October 16, 2009 
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Housing Market Analysis 
 
By Scott Aster, Oregon Association of Realtors [OAR] Fellow 
& Certificate of Real Estate Development Graduate Student 
 
 
Median Home Values of Existing Detached Homes 
  U.S. West 
Portland 
Metro 
Area 
August 2008 Median Sales Price 
 $        
201,900  
 $      
254,900  
 $      
290,000  
August 2009 Median Sales Price 
 $        
177,500  
 $      
225,600  
 $      
260,000  
% Change in Median Sales Price -12.1% -11.5% -10.3% 
% Change in Number of Sales Aug 
2008-2009 2.5% 7.1% 27.3% 
Source: National Association of Realtors (August 2009) and RMLS (August 2009) 
 
Once again the housing market statistics reflect a decrease in value from the prior year.  
Median home prices were down 12.1% annually in August, and 11.5% for the western part of 
the nation.  According to May’s Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller index, the metro areas with the 
greatest annual depreciation rates are Las Vegas (-31%), Phoenix (-28%), Detroit (-25%), and 
Miami (-21%).  However, prices are still substantially higher than they were before the housing 
bubble. For Portland, the index based on a home valued at $100,000 in 2000 stood at 
$150,060 at the end of July 2009.  The number of building permits issued was down 33% 
nationally, with a reduction of 38% in Oregon.   
 
 
Source: http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/MetroPrice 
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Building Permits Issued 
  Year to Date (all data in thousands) 
  SINGLE-FAMILY MULTIFAMILY 
  
Aug-
09 
Aug-
08 
PCT 
CHG 
Aug-
09 
Aug-
08 
PCT 
CHG 
UNITED STATES 
       
291.3  
     
435.3  -33% 
       
92.5  
     
245.2  -62% 
OREGON 
         
3.84  
       
6.19  -38% 
       
1.46  
       
3.41  -57% 
Bend OR 
         
0.24  
       
0.52  -54% 
       
0.03  
       
0.08  -67% 
Corvallis OR 
         
0.03  
       
0.03  -4% -    -    -     
Eugene-Springfield OR 
         
0.30  
       
0.48  -38% 
       
0.08  
       
0.12  -30% 
Medford OR 
         
0.21  
       
0.31  -30% 
       
0.01  
       
0.05  -89% 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA 
         
1.98  
       
3.34  -41% 
       
0.59  
       
2.94  -80% 
Salem OR 
         
0.24  
       
0.42  -44% 
       
0.10  
       
0.21  -50% 
Source: National Association of Home Builders (August 2009)  
 
Portland 
The number of Portland metropolitan area home sales increased by 25% over the second 
quarter, as buyers closed purchases on 4,191 existing homes.  This is an increase of 14% over 
the previous year.  Median prices for the third quarter were at $258,000, a 1% increase over 
the previous quarter, but an 11% reduction annually.  Prices are still being marked down, with 
average sales taking place at 91.68% of the original list price, 1.96% less than the previous 
year.  Sellers in the Portland area, on average, have their homes on the market for 72 days 
before closing, reflecting a one-week increase from 2008.  Price per-square-foot values 
increased slightly again to $139, a 2% increase from the previous quarter.  However, this 
reflects a 9% decrease annually. 
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Median Sales Price & Number of Homes Sales Per Quarter - Existing Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
Sale Price/Original List Price& Average Days on Market – Existing Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County)  
8-Year outlook for Median Sales Price  
& Number of transactions 
 
2nd Quarter Median Price: $258,000 
Quarterly % Change: 0.95% 
Annual % Change: -11.00% 
 
Number of Transactions: 4,191 
Quarterly % Change: 25.40% 
Annual % Change: 14.13% 
8-Year outlook for Average DOM and Sales 
Price/Original List Price ratio 
1st Quarter Sale/Original ratio: 91.68 
Quarterly % Change: -.076% 
Annual % Change: -2.09% 
 
Days on Market: 72 
Quarterly % Change:-6.50% 
Annual % Change: 10.77% 
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On a note of optimism, six of the submarkets listed below experienced quarterly price 
appreciation while one remained unchanged.  The other submarkets experienced a decline in 
value.  Lake Oswego/West Linn home prices increased the most at 10.28% followed by 
Beaverton/Aloha at 4.49% and Oregon City/Canby at 3.82%.  
 
Conversely, the Southeast Portland area experienced the highest depreciation rate at (-5.17%), 
followed by West Portland at (-4.00%).  However, annual results are negative for all but two 
Portland area submarkets.  Columbia County (3.5%) and Mt. Hood Government Camp/Wemme 
(1.4%) are the only two submarkets that experienced an increase in value from the previous 
year.  Conversely Southeast (-15.1%) and Northeast Portland (-13.3%) home values depreciated 
the most from 2008. 
 
Median Sales Price & Number of Transactions – New Detached Homes 
Portland Metro (Excluding Clark County) 
8-Year outlook for new construction             
single-family home sales 
 
1st Quarter Median Price: $315,000 
Quarterly % Change: -7.20% 
Annual % Change: -12.48% 
 
Number of Transactions: 415 
Quarterly % Change: 8.07% 
Annual % Change: -50.47% 
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Vancouver 
After declining over the previous six quarters, Vancouver’s home values finally experienced a 
quarterly increase.  Vancouver’s median home price was $203,825 resulting in an increase 
from the previous quarter (4.5%) but a decrease from the previous year (-11%) in home values. 
On another positive note, the number of home sales increased to 714, up 10% quarterly and 
21% annually.  However, the number of days on the market is up to 86, a 15% increase from 
2008. 
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In the suburbs of Clark County, home prices have dropped to $240,750 a 2% drop from the 
previous quarter’s median price of S245,000.  An annual comparison indicates that home 
prices are down 10% from 2008.  Similar to Vancouver, the number of home transactions in 
the Clark County suburbs is up 19% for the quarter and 22% annually.  But the number of 
days on the market has increased 66% annually and is up to 103. 
 
Most Vancouver/Clark County submarkets experienced price appreciation for the quarter.    
North Felida  home values increased the most (20%) followed by North Salmon Creek (14%).  
Conversely, the East Heights area had the highest depreciation rate at (-17%) followed by 
Washougal (-12%) and Downtown Vancouver (-11%).   
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Condominium and Attached Market1 
The number of condominium sales in the Portland metropolitan market is up significantly from 
the previous quarter but is still down from 2008.  Across the metropolitan area, the number of 
sales is up 38% for the quarter while the number of Vancouver sales increased 89%.  The 
Portland metropolitan area’s price per square foot is at $177, a decrease of 15% quarterly and 
13% annually.  The median price per Portland condominium unit is $188,700 down 6% from 
the second quarter.  Vancouver, at a price per square foot of $111, is down 17% for the quarter 
and 20% for the year.  Vancouver’s median price per condominium is up to $126,950 a 
decrease of 18% for the quarter. 
 
Results for single-family attached housing are up for the quarter as well as annually.  The 
number of attached home sales in the Portland metropolitan area increased 37% from the 
second quarter to 398.  The number of sales of attached homes is up 13% annually with a 
median price of $195,000.  The Vancouver area saw both quarterly (1%) and annual (24%) 
increases as the number of attached homes sold increased to 77.  For Portland, price-per-
square-foot numbers ($131) are down 6% from the second quarter and 16% annually.  
Vancouver, at $111 per square foot, saw a quarterly increase of 4% but an annual decrease of 
14%.  The median price for attached homes in Vancouver was $169,900. 
 
                                                
1 RMLS defines attached as “an element of the residence construction is shared with another property.  
Condominiums are excluded.  Condominiums are defined as an attached or stand-alone residence for which the 
owner has title to the space inside the unit and shares common spaces with other unit owners in accordance with 
specific legal guidelines. 
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Central Oregon 
Both Bend and Redmond experienced a slight increase from the previous year with respect to 
the number of homes sold. Bend home sales are up 37% to 443 while Redmond’s increased 
79% to 204.  The number of days on the market declined to 149 for Bend and 149 for Redmond 
as well.  However, the median home prices declined significantly for both Central Oregon 
submarkets.  Bend home prices plummeted (-27%) to $205,000 while Redmond prices slipped 
(-32%) to $145,000. Price-per-square-foot numbers also declined significantly for Bend and 
Redmond at $109 and $85. 
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As it is commonly reported in Central Oregon’s reports, the housing stock is separated by lot 
size – properties under one acre and those between one and five acres.  Price per square foot is 
provided to control for lot size between both categories.  Third quarter statistics are mostly 
negative for Central Oregon homes on acreage.  Bend transactions increased 78% from 2008 
while Redmond experienced an increase of 27%.  However, Bend home prices plummeted (-
35%) to $273,690 while Redmond prices slipped (-24%) to $212,000.  Price per square foot is 
down -34%  to $133 for Bend and -30% to $112 for Redmond.  The number of days on the 
market decreased for both areas as Bend is at 165 and Redmond is at 237. 
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Willamette Valley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Willamette Valley submarkets experienced annual depreciation on existing home prices.   
 
Keizer suffered the worst quarter in the valley with declining prices of (-14.2%) followed closely 
by Linn County at (-11.5%).  
 
Marion County was the stronger submarket but still suffered a (-5.4%) depreciation rate.  On a 
positive note, the number of transactions over the past year also increased for all of these areas 
with Benton County increasing the most (56%).   
 
The number of days on the market decreased for all of these submarkets with the exception of 
Linn County. 
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Salem 
 
Salem’s housing market continues to suffer annual deprecation of home prices, fewer home 
transactions, and a greater number of days on the market.  Prices declined (-9%) from the 
previous year to $179,900.  Meanwhile, the number of average days on the market increased to 
132, approximately four and a half months.  The number of transactions declined (-16%) from 
the previous year to 431. 
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Eugene/Springfield 
 
 
The Eugene/Springfield area experienced declining home prices relative to the third quarter of 
2008.  However, the number of transactions rose 6% annually to 579.  The median price was 
down 8% to $215,000.  Sellers currently have had their houses on the market for 79 days 
before closing and are realizing 92.67% of their original listing price on the sale.   
 
